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The aim of this dissertation is to enquire into the 
rationality of religious belief and, in particular, into the 
rationality of the Christian belief-system. 
The method employed is one of analysing what Christians have 
had to say about the rationality of what they believe rather than 
that of first arriving at a set of conditions severally necessary 
and jointly sufficient for the rationality of belief in general, 
and then determining whether or not the Christian belief-system 
would satisfy them. 
Irrationalism is the first position that is examined, with 
particular reference to the work of Soren Kierkegaard. The 
Irrationalist holds both that there is a fundamental conflict 
between faith and reason, and that irrationality is an absolute 
condition of an adequate Christian Faith. Both tenets of the. 
Irrationalist's position are considered and each is rejected as 
untenable. 
The second position examined is that of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
Aquinas argues that there is a body of evidence which can settle 
the dispute between believer and sceptic. His position is examined 
with particular reference to his distinction between the preambles 
to faith and the articles of faith. A number of inconsistencies 
are pointed out. 
Chapters 3 and 4 consider two of the more important arguments 
for the existence of God. Chapter 3 considers the Ontological 
Argument with particular reference to Saint Anselm's version of it. 
The argument is rejected as are modern attempts to resurrect it. 
Chapter 4 considers the Cosmological Argument with particular 
reference to the first and most important three of Aquinas' five 
ways. These are also found wanting. 
Chapter 5 focuses upon two contemporary attempts to defend 
Christianity against charges that it is irrational in the absence 
of a successful theistic proof. The positions considered are those 
of Norman Malcolm and Alvin Plantinga. Whilst there are 
significant differences between the two, both point out that 
evidence must end somewhere and argue that belief in the existence 
of God belongs to that set of beliefs which do not require 
evidence. Both positions are found wanting. 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to enquire into the 
rationality of religious belief: to determine whether or not there 
is some sense in which religious belief can be considered rational. 
It is a difficult task requiring clear definition from the start. 
We must be certain that we understand the term "religious 
belief" and be clear on which method we are to employ in deciding 
whether or not religious belief is rational. The first issues that 
we must deal with, then, are conceptual and methodological ones. 
To begin with, it is important to realise that the term 
"religious belief" is used to refer to one particular system of 
religious belief, that of Christianity, and not to religious belief 
as such. After all, there are a large number of religions, each 
with its own unique system of beliefs. Whilst there may be some 
over-lap between the beliefs of individual religions, we should not 
be surprised to find a great deal of variation. Both Jews and 
Moslems, for example, believe in the existence of a supreme being, 
but there are many fundamental beliefs which they do not hold in 
common 	 This area of disagreement would be even greater amongst 
Jews and Hindus, or Jews and Buddhists. 	 Here there would not 
necessarily be agreement even about the existence of a supreme 
being. This being the case, it is not altogether clear how much 
sense it makes to talk of religious belief as such. It may be 
that there is no set of beliefs common to all religions, or If 
there is, that this set is a very small one. For this thesis to be 
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manageable, then, our concern must remain with one particular 
religion: Christianity. To this extent the title is misleading. 
Our main objective is to evaluate the rationality of the Christian 
belief-system. 
In attempting to fulfil this objective, however, one is faced 
with rather large methodological problems. The most natural way to 
proceed, it would seem, would be to outline a set of conditions, 
severally necessary and Jointly sufficient for the rationality of 
belief in general and then to determine whether or not the 
Christian belief-system would satisfy them. The problem with this 
method, however, is that it is notoriously difficult to arrive at 
any non-trivial conditions for the rationality of belief. Consider 
the following example to illustrate this point: 
The concept of rationality, we would agree, is closely 
connected to that of evidence. Indeed, it is often claimed that 
the process of proportioning the degree of one's belief to the 
strength of the available evidence is paradigmatic of rationality. 
We might proceed, then, by including a proposition something along 
the following lines amongst our necessary conditions for 
rationality:- 
(1) A belief can only be rational if the strength with which 
it is held is in direct proportion to the strength of the 
available evidence supporting its truth. 
However, a number of problems immediately spring to mind. To 
begin with, the term "available evidence" is far from crystal 
clear. To whom must this evidence be available? If I evaluate the 
truth of some proposition and reject it because of failure through 
carelessness, lack of time, or whatever, to find some crucial bit 
of evidence that would otherwise be available to me, am I being 
rational or not? Secondly, even if I manage to uncover all the 
available evidence, how do I determine the strength of some set of 
evidence E for the truth of some proposition p? Are there any 
rules or procedures for this? It is often argued that this process 
is a matter for personal Judgment and perhaps It is, but what if 
two or more individuals exercise their personal Judgment and arrive 
at vastly different conclusions? This, after all, is a common 
things in academic circles. It might be argued that some people 
are more rational than others and that we must follow the Judgment 
of the most rational of the group, but even here how does one 
decide whether some person A is more rational than some other 
person B? Thirdly, how do we decide whether E really is evidence 
for p? Are there rules for this or do we once again rely upon 
personal Judgment? I do not wish to suggest that these questions 
have no answer. Perhaps they do. Nevertheless, they do show that 
(1) is not as straight-forward as it would seem on first 
inspection. 
The problems, however, do not end here. There is a far more 
serious consideration for anyone who puts (1) forward as a 
necessary condition for the rationality of belief. The problem is 
that we cannot demand that all of our beliefs have the support of 
the available evidence without committing ourselves to vicious 
circularity or to an infinite regress of Justification. 
Our evidence for any particular belief that we hold must 
consist of other beliefs that we hold. I cannot argue that some 
set of propositions E is evidence for - some proposition p without 
holding that the propositions that make up E are themselves true. 
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These propositions, in other words, are themselves beliefs which I 
hold. But if p is to be rational, the beliefs which make up E must 
also be rational and, according to (1), these beliefs cannot be 
rational unless some new set of evidence El supports their truth. 
Now, the propositions that make up El must also be rational and 
thus require Justification. In other words, we must have evidence 
for our evidence and new evidence for this evidence and so on ad 
infinitum, or else be committed to circularity. 	 Either way, we 
have not provided an adequate Justification for our beliefs. 	 It 
must be rational, in other words, to hold that some of our beliefs 
are "basic"; that there are beliefs for which we require no 
evidence but to which we can appeal in order to justify other 
beliefs that we hold. Thus, we cannot hold that (1) is a necessary 
condition of rationality. 
The problems faced by any individual attempting to outline a 
non-trivial set of conditions for the rationality of belief, it 
will be agreed, are enormous. The difficulty is not so much that 
the problems I have raised cannot be solved, perhaps they can, but 
that it seems likely that the solutions will vary according to 
particular instances. It seems unlikely, for example, that we will 
be able to determine the conditions under which some set of 
purported evidence E is relevant to the truth of p without being 
aware of the content of p. Any approach that requires a set of 
conditions for the rationality of belief in general will flounder 
from the start due to the enormity of the task involved. 
A more fruitful approach might be to analyse what Christians 
themselves have had to say about the rationality of what they 
believe. Such an approach would involve a critical analysis both 
of the positions that Christians have adopted concerning the status 
of their belief and of the criteria or conditions of rationality 
which they use, be they explicit or implicit. In this way we could 
avoid the type of problems which have been outlined above without 
shirking the issues involved. 
At first glance it might appear that this approach is beset 
with as many difficulties as the first. Just as it would prove 
difficult to outline specific conditions for the rationality of 
belief in general, even a cursory glance at Christian Apologetics 
reveals a plethora of divergent views and positions. It is simply 
not true that there is a specific Christian response to the 
question of rationality. Contrast, for example, the views of a 
Kierkegaard to those of Aquinas. The former claims that there is a 
necessary antithesis between faith and reason, whereas the latter 
talks of a perfect harmony between the two. Thus, it would appear 
that there is not even agreement about the value of rationality let 
alone upon the substantive question of whether or not the Christian 
belief-system is a rational one. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me, that for all the divergence and 
disagreement, we may talk of broad positions and accept that some 
thinkers have more of importance to say than others. Thus, 
although we could not possibly examine the positions of all those 
who have responded to our question, we can identify those which we 
consider to be the most important. It is my intention to do this. 
This first chapter of this dissertation will deal with a 
position which I will call "Irrationalism". This is the view that 
there can be no such thing as a rational Christian Faith; that 
Faith and reason are necessarily opposed to one another. This view 
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is typified and finds its most influential exposition in the work 
of Kierkegaard and it is upon his work that we will concentrate. 
It is important because it challenges, a priori, our main aim. If 
Christianity is of its essence irrational then there is little 
point in proceeding with our task. We will find, however, that the 
basic tenets of Irrationalism are without substance. 
The second, third and fourth chapters will deal with the 
traditional response to the question of rationality; that 
Christianity, is rational because philosophers, through the use of 
demonstrative argument, can' provide the epistemological preambles 
for faith. Chapter two will examine the most influential proponent 
of this position St. Thomas Aquinas, whilst chapters three and 
four will consider examples for the Ontological and Cosmological 
Arguments for the existence of God. This traditional form of rapologetic, whilst not as obviously fallacious-las philosophers 
would sometimes have us believe, will also be found wanting. / _ 
The final chapter will examine two attempts to defend the 
rationality of religious belief in the absence of a successful 
demonstrative proof of the truth of theism. 	 The philosophers 
considered will be Norman Malcolm and Alvin Plantinga. 	 Whilst 
there are significant differences between their respective 
positions, both point out that evidence must end somewhere and that 
theistic belief belongs to that set of beliefs which do not require 
demonstration. Their arguments are interesting and valuable but, 
once again, fail to answer certain crucial points. Thus our 
general conclusion will be that no successful attempt to defend the 
rationality of religious belief has been found and that this casts 
doubt upon the possibility of successfully undertaking such a task. 
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The first position that I wish to consider is that which I 
will call "IRRATIONALISM". According to the Irrationalist there is 
a fundamental conflict between faith and reason. Religious belief, 
he argues, is positively irrational; to consider it from the 
standpoint of reason alone is to reject it. To this extent the 
Irrationalist concurs with the atheist. Where he differs is in his 
continued adherence to Christianity. Faith, he claims, allows him 
to rise above the dictates of reason. Indeed, he considers 
irrationality to be an absolute condition of an adequate Christian 
faith. 
This position is an odd one to say the least. 	 The 
Irrationalist requires that faith fly in the face of reason, that 
it affirm what our cognitive faculties tell us is wrong. The 
natural response of most, sceptic and believer alike, is to reject 
it out of hand but to do this would be unfortunate. The 
Irrationalist deserves serious consideration for at least two 
reasons. The first of these is historical, the second 
philosophical. 
To begin with, his position is almost as old as Christianity 
itself. Tertullian (c.160-c.220), for example, drew attention to 
the paradoxical nature of Christianity in statements such as that 
asserting that the Doctrine of the Incarnation is "certain because 
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impossible". His work has been influential amongst educated and • 
uneducated believers alike. More recently, existentialists such as 
the Dane, Kierkegaard and the Spaniard, Unamuno have espoused forms 
of Irrationalism, elements of which have influenced many 
contemporary theologians, particularly of a Protestant persuasion. 
The history and influence of Irrationalism in itself 
constitutes sufficient reason for dealing with it seriously in this 
thesis, but there is a more important reason. The Irrationalist 
challenges an assumption made by most philosophers of religion, be 
they of a sceptical or apologetic bent. This assumption concerns 
the value of rationality. Although there may be disagreement about 
whether or not religious belief is rational, philosophers of 
religion usually agree that it ought to be rejected if it is found 
to be irrational. The Irrationalist does not.. He refuses to 
-  - 	 - _ accept that there are any rational constraints upon what we may or 
may not believe in the area of religion. In doing this he seeks to 
take religion once and for all out of the competence of philosophy. 
There are two basic tenets of Irrationalism that require our 
attention. The first is the claim that there is a fundamental 
conflict between faith and reason, that religious belief is 
1. Tertullian De Carne Christi, Ch 5, quoted in The Encyclopedia • 
of Philosophy ed Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 
S.V. -Tertullion, Quintus Septimus Florens", by Robert Grant 
p. 95. 
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positively irrational. The second is that this irrationality is an 
absolute condition of an adequate Christian faith. Let us consider 
each of these in turn. 
Our first task is one of clarification. We must understand 
the Irrationalist's claim that Christianity is positively 
irrational before we can comment on it. As we shall see, he uses 
the term in the strongest sense possible. 
It is sometimes claimed that belief in the absence of adequate 
evidence is irrational. W.K. Clifford, for example, is famous for 
his assertion that it is "wrong always, everywhere, and for 
everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.' There 
are many who have agreed with him. Antony Flew being the most , 
influential amongst contemporary philosophers.2 On their view it 
is irrational to hold any proposition without having good reason to 
believe that it is true. Where the evidence for some proposition 
is ambiguous or inconclusive, they claim, the only appropriate 
attitude towards it is suspension of belief. 	 Thus, for 
Christianity to be irrational:- in this sense of the word, it is 
sufficient to demonstrate the inadequacy of any positive evidence 
presented by the believer. Unless the Christian can show that his 
position is true he must accept, according to the disciples of 
1. V. K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief", in God Man and  
Religion, ed. Keith E. Yandell (Sydney: McGraw Hill, 1973), 
p. 509. 
2. See Anthony Flew, God and Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, 
Bruce and World, 1966) and The Presumption of Atheist (New 
York: Barnes and Noble, 1976). 
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Clifford and Flew, that it is irrational. 
The position of the Irrationalist, however, is much stronger 
than this. His is not a wishy-washy acceptance of the inconclusive 
nature of any evidence in support of Christianity. His claim is 
that an objective consideration of the matter will lead to an 
outright rejection of Christian belief. It is his view that 
Christianity, when considered from the standpoint of reason alone, 
is complete nonsense. It is not just that we cannot establish the 
truth of Christianity but that all the available evidence suggests 
that it is false. 
The Irrationalist characteristically points to an element of 
the paradoxical or absurd at the very heart of Christianity. We 
have already noted Tertullian's attitude towards the Doctrine of 
the Incarnation and it is interesting to note the similarities 
between his position and that of Kierkegaard. 
"The absurd is - that the eternal truth has cone 
into being in time, that God has come into being, has 
been born, has grown up, and so forth, precisely like 
any other individual human being, quite 
indistinguishable from other individuals".' 
What can be more absurd, Kierkegaard asks, than the claim that 
God and man were united in the person of Jesus Christ? God, after 
all, is the eternal truth; an infinite being, without limit. Man, 
on the other hand, is finite, limited, a creature. How can it be 
1. Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated 
by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), p. 188. 
possible for Christ to be both human and divine? For Kierkegaard, 
it is not. 
This is not to say that Kierkegaard, or other Irrationalists 
for that matter, held that all Christian beliefs were essentially 
paradoxical or absurd in the way that the Doctrine of the 
Incarnation was held to be.' Kierkegaard seem to have held that 
some religious beliefs were not only intelligible but that reason 
could provide us with some probability concerning their truth. 
Various historical assertions found in the Bible seems to fall into 
this category. Similarly, the question of God's existence seems to 
have been a perfectly intelligible one for him. Here, however, 
reason cannot decide the issue either way. 
"I contemplate the order of nature in the hope of 
finding God, and I see omnipotence and wisdom; but I 
also see much else that disturbs my mind and excites 
anxiety. The sum of all this is objective 
uncertainty. 112 
Nevertheless, for the Irrationalist, the paradoxical lies at 
the very heart of Christianity and it is this absurdity at the very 
centre of the structure which makes the whole belief-system 
unacceptable to the man of reason. The situation might be likened 
to that of a house built on weak foundations. Certain parts of the 
structure, the roof for example, may be sound when considered by 
1. Paul Edwards, "Kierkegaard and the "Truth" of Christianity", 
in A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, 3rd ed., ed. Paul 
Edwards and Arthur Pap (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 507. 
2. Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 182. 
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themselves but will still collapse if the foundations give way. 
Thus, even though certain parts of the Christian belief system may 
have some credence when considered by themselves, the whole must be 
considered irrational because of absurdity at the very heart of the 
structure. 
II 
Let us consider this claim about the ultimate absurdity of 
Christianity a little more closely. It rests, as we have already 
seen, upon an observation of the paradoxical nature of certain 
doctrines of central importance to the Christian religion. Now, 
few religious thinkers would deny the paradoxical nature of 
Christianity, but they would wish to know what sense of the word 
the Irrationalist is using and argue that the words "paradoxical" 
and "absurd" are not necessarily interchangable. 
If we consider the word "paradoxical" we will see that it can 
be used in either one of two ways. To say of some statement that 
it is paradoxical might be to say that it is puzzling, difficult to 
understand, that it is in conflict with our own picture of the 
world. Scientific statements are often said by the uninitiated to 
be paradoxical in this sense. The important thing about this sense 
of the word "paradoxical" is that the statements in question are 
not considered to be unintelligible in themselves; they can be 
understood by those with enough ability and background knowledge to 
unravel their meaning. The apparent contradictions are capable of 
resolution by the expert even if they appear nonsensical to the 
layman. On the other hand, the term "paradoxical" can be used to 
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mean something 	 like "logically 	 inconsistent" or 	 "self- 
contradictory". In this sense of the word the statements in 
question are unintelligible in themselves. It does not matter how 
much ability or what background knowledge a person has, the 
contradictions will remain unresolved. 
For most religious thinkers, doctrines such as that of the 
Incarnation are paradoxicalpin the first sense of the word. The 
contradictions which they lead us into cannot be resolved by us, 
but this does not mean that they are unintelligible in themselves. 
To a perfect intellect, such as that possessed by God, they would 
be perfectly comprehensible. However, if we take the Irrationalist 
at face value his claim is that they are paradoxical in the second 
sense of the word, that they are unintelligible in themselves. To 
quote Kierkegaard: 
"Instead of the objective uncertainty, there is 
here a certainty, namely, that objectively it is 
absurd; and this absurdity, held fast in the passion 
of inwardness, is faith."' 
The Irrationalist's assertion of the absurdity of religious 
belief, it would seem, amounts to a claim that certain doctrines at 
the very heart of Christianity are self-contradictory. But" if a 
proposition is self-contradictory, then by our normal understanding 
of the term, its truth is logically impossible. Thus, if we are to 
' take the Irrationalist at his word, he is exhorting belief in the 
logically impossible. 	 Indeed, he is claiming that 	 logical 
1. Ibid., p. 188. 
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impossibility is an absolute condition of an adequate Christian 
faith. 
This position is a strange one to say the least. Can I really 
believe the logically impossible, let alone claim that logical 
impossibility is a condition of belief? Can I, for example, really 
believe that square circles exist? Perhaps I can if I do not fully 
understand the words "square" and "circle", but if I do understand 
them and use the terns in the normal way then it would be an 
ultimate act of folly to attempt a drawing of one. 
The problem is that, in our normal usage, the terms "believe" I 	 _ 
and "self-contradictory" preclude one another. 	 In our usual 
understanding of the word, to believe something is to believe that 
it is true. I can hardly claim to believe some proposition unless 
I hold that the proposition in question is true. But, our normal 
understanding of the term "self-contradictory" implies that a 
statement involving self-contradiction is necessarily false. Thus, 
if I am asked to believe something that is self-contradictory, I am 
asked to believe something that is necessarily false and, since 
believing something is believing that it is true, I am being asked 
to believe that the necessarily false is true. But this is 
complete nonsense. I simply cannot do it. 
Thus, either we use the word "believe" in a very foreign way 
so that the statement "I believe p" does not necessarily imply ." I 
hold that p is true" or we must deny the Law of Non-Contradiction 
and accept that self-contradictory statements may be true. I can 
make no headway with the first possibility, so let us turn to the 
second. After all, there have been a number of philosophers, of 
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whom Hegel is the most widely known, who have done precisely this. 
But this too leads us into trouble. 
The Law of Non-Contradiction states that the truth of some 
proposition necessarily excludes the truth of its denial. To 
accept the Law of Non-Contradiction, then, is to accept that an 
assertion of the truth of some proposition, p, automatically 
involves a denial of the truth of its contradictory, -p and to 
reject this law is to allow that both p and -p may be true. But if 
we are to do this then we must be aware of the consequences of our 
action. To deny the Law of Non-Contradiction, I would suggest, is 
to deny the possibility of successful assertion altogether. If, 
for example, I do not automatically rule out the possibility that 
it is not raining outside when I assert that it is, am I really 
asserting anything at all? I do not see how. The point is that 
successful assertion presupposes the Law of Non-Contradiction, 
without it all assertion would be meaningless. 
It may be argued that the Irrationalist does not wish to 
reject the Law of Non-contradiction altogether. After all, he does 
not deny the importance of rationality in spheres other than the 
religious and perhaps his denial of the Law of Non-Contradiction 
applies only to religion as well. Such a claim, however, misses 
the point. The fact of the matter is that Irrationalists such as 
Kierkegaard do wish to assert the truth - ofrdoctr i nes such as that 
of the Incarnation. They could hardly fail to do so. But, if 
successful assertion presupposes the Law of Non-Contradiction, as 
we have argued, their position must surely be untenable. As 
Blanshard has put it: 
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"He can hardly have it both ways. If the logic 
he assumes in his philosophy is valid, then the faith 
which stands at the summit of 'the stages on life's 
way' is meaningless. If the irrational faith is 
accepted, the principles on which reflection conducts 
itself are everywhere impugned. In that case, 
Kierkegaard should merely smile like Buddha and remain 
silent."' 
III 
• 	 The Irrationalist would not rest easy with this rejection of 
his position. Let us consider Kierkegaard as an example. His 
reply to our objections would, no doubt, consist of an affirmation 
of his famous claim that truth is subjectivity. "It is 
subjectivity that Christianity is concerned with", he tells us, 
"and it is only in subjectivity that its truth exists, if it exists 
at all; objectively, Christianity has absolutely no existence at 
all".2 But what does this all mean? What is involved in this claim 
that truth is subjectivity? Kierkegaard elucidates it in the 
following manner: 
"When the question of truth is raised in an 
objective manner, reflection is directed objectively 
to the truth, as an object to which the knower is 
1.Brand Blanshard, Reason and Belief, (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1974), p. 242. 
2.Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 116. 
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related. 	 Reflection is not focused upon the 
relationship, however, but upon the question of 
whether it is the truth to which the knower is 
related. If only the object to which he is related is 
the truth, the subject is accounted to be in the 
truth. When the question of the truth is raised 
subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to 
the nature of the individual relationship; if only 
the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the 
Individual is in the truth even if he should happen to 
be thus related to what is not true."' 
Kierkegaard is drawing our attention to a distinction between 
the objective content of our beliefs and our subjective attitude 
. towards them; between that which we believe and the manner of our 
belief. Else-where he tells us that the "objective accent falls on 
WHAT is said, the subjective accent on How it is said ".2 I am in 
the truth objectively, then, if what I believe is actually true and 
I am in the truth subjectively if I believe it in an appropriate 
manner. 	 The appropriate manner, moreover, is one of passionate 
commitment. Passion, he tells us, is the "culmination of existence 
_ 
to an existing individual - and we are all of us existing 
individuals".2 To be in the truth subjectively, then, is to hold 
one's beliefs with all the passion of one's soul. 
1. Ibid., p. 178. 
2. Ibid., p. 181. 
3. Ibid., p. 176. 
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The essence of Kierkegaard's position, then, is that we need 
not worry about the objective truth of Christianity since its 
nature is subjectivity. The .content of Christianity, in other 
words, is of no importance, what matters is the manner of belief 
and this must be one of passionate comnittment. 
Now, Kierkegaard is certainly correct in his assertion that 
Christianity demands more than just a passive acceptance of its 
teaching. Theologians never seem to tire of drawing a distinction 
between mere belief that God exists and belief in God. One can 
believe that God exists without making a committment to a Christian 
way of life and it is precisely this committment which 
characterises belief in God. The Christian, it is argued, is not 
only required to believe that God exist but also to believe in God. 
Even so, he is still required to believe that He exists. The 
objective content of his beliefs cannot be irrelevant to the 
Christian, as Kierkegaard seems to imply in his statement that 
truth is subjectivity. If it is, then how are we to distinguish 
between the Christian and the non-Christian? It cannot simply be 
the manner of his belief since it is possible to belive any number 
of things in a passionate manner. I may, for example, believe 
passionately that there is no God. Does this make me a Christian? 
Of course it does not. Kierkegaard may be correct in his assertion 
that the manner of belief is crucial to Christianity, but he must 
be wrong in his claim that the objective content is not. 
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Up to this point our argument has been concerned with the 
first tenet of the Irrationalist's position; that there is a 
fundemental conflict between faith and reason. This, as we have 
seen, rested upon an assertion of the paradoxical nature of 
fundamental Christian doctrines and was found to be wanting. I now 
wish to turn my attention to the second tenet of his position; that 
irrationality is an absolute condition of an adequate or proper 
Christian faith. Here too I will draw mainly upon the works of 
Kierkegaard. 
Kierkegaard, as we have already noted, was at pains to stress 
the importance to Christianity not only of belief, but of belief in 
an appropriate manner. A Christian faith, he suggested, that does 
not involve passionate icommitment is not an adequate one at all. 
This much I think we can accept, but he goes on to argue that the 
passion required is not possible without objective uncertainity. 
"The sum of all this is objective uncertainty. 
But it is for this very reason that the inwardness 
becomes as intense as it is, for it embraces this 
objective uncertainty with the entire person of the 
infinite. In the case of a mathematical proposition 
the objectivity is given, but forthis reason the truth 
of such a proposition is also an indifferent truth."' 
The essence of Kierkegaard's argument is that faith cannot 
exist without passion and that passion cannot exist without 
1. Ibid., p. 182. 
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objective uncertainty. 	 Where there is objective certainty 
concerning the truth of some proposition, as is the case with 
mathematics, he suggests, our acceptance of that proposition is 
characterised by its passivity. Objective certainty, according to 
him, would destroy faith. 
"If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I 
do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this 
I must believe. If I wish to preserve myself in faith 
I must constantly be intent upon holding fast the 
objective uncertainty, so as to remain out upon the 
deep, over seventy thousand fathoms of water, still 
preserving my faith."' 
That Christianity requires passionate /commitment_ I have 
already accepted, but the proposition that passionate 'commitment; 
is only possible where there is objective uncertainty is an 
entirely different matter. Kierkegaard's argument in favour of 
this position proceeds as follows: 
"...without risk there is no faith, and the 
greater the risk the greater the, .faith; the more 
objective security the less inwardness.., and the less 
objective security the more profound the possible 
inwardness."2 
Thus, Kierkegaard correlates the passion of one's! commitment' 
to a particular belief with the degree of risk involved in the 
- - - - 	- acceptance of it. He holds that passionatei commitment'is only 
1.Ibid. 
2.Ibid., p. 188. 
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possible where there is risk and the amount of passion will be in 
direct proportion to the amount of risk involved. The greater the 
risk of error, the more intense will be the passion involved. 
Thus, it follows that the mare irrational religious belief is, the 
more religiously adequate it is. 
This is a startling conclusion, but are we under any 
compulsion to accept it? I think not. Kierkegaard correlates 
faith with passion, and passion with risk. I will not dispute his 
correlation of faith and passion but it seems to me that the 
correlation of passion and risk requires far greater scrutiny. 
To begin with, it seems to me that Kierkegaard was correct in 
his correlation of passion and risk in at least some areas of human 
behaviour. The example which Immediately springs to mind is that 
of gambling, consider the example of John, an avid punter who 
follows form and is considered quite knowledgeable in racing 
circles, and let us place him into the following situations: 
A. John places a bet of $5 on a horse which is a strong 
favourite to win at odds of 3/2. 
B. John places a bet of $50 on a horse which is an outsider 
at odds of 10/1. 
C. John places all his life savings on a rank outsider at 
odds of 500/1. 
In each of these situations, John has studied the form guide 
with great care and is not privy to any inside information. Quite 
clearly, we would expect John to show some interest in the race in 
- 22 - 
each situation and it is equally clear that his interest would be 
more passionate in B. than it was in A., and in C. than it was 
in either B. or A.. Why? The risk involved is a crucial factor. 
The amount of money riding on the race is greater in each new 
situation than it was in the previous one, as are the odds of that 
horse winning when previous form, track conditions and so on are 
taken into account. The greater the risk, the more intense would 
be John's passion. What could be simpler? 
To further illustrate this point let US consider another 
situation: 
D. John place his life savings on the sane horse as he did 
in C., with the sane odds, but with the prior knowledge 
that the race has been fixed and that his horse will win. 
We would still expect John to be interested in this race, but 
we would also expect his interest to be far less passionate. 
Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine him watching the race with a 
certain amount of calm disdain, his only worry being the 
possibility (remote if the plan is good) of something going wrong. 
Here, then, at the very least, we can accept Kierkegaard's 
correlation of risk and passion. 
This example is very instructive since it provides us with an 
important insight into Kierkegaard's understanding of faith. The 
model of faith which he presents to us is of a person risking 
everything, against all odds, in the hope of eternal salvation. 
"Without having understood Christianity," he tells us,"..., I have 
still understood enough to apprehend that it proposes to bestow an 
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eternal happiness upon the individual man." 	 But in order to 
achieve this eternal happiness the man of faith must make a blind 
leap into the dark; he must risk all in the hope that he may gain 
everything. 
Kierkegaard's man of faith, then, is very much like our punter 
in situation C.. Both are risking everything in the hope of a 
future reward and neither can profess to any certainty about the 
result. In fact, both can profess to a great deal of uncertainty; 
the odds being stacked against them. The actions of both are 
clearly irrational in the extreme and it is precisely this 
irrationality that results in their passionate concern with what 
they have done. 
It is evident, then, that a correlation of passion and risk is 
possible and that we can construct a model of faith based upon such 
a correlation. But there are still two areas in which we can 
challenge Kierkegaard. Firstly, even if passion and risk may be 
correlated successfully, must all risk be irrational and secondly, 
does a model of faith based upon passion arising out of risk 
constitute the only or even the best possible model of faith? To 
both of these question I believe we can answer, No! 
V" I 
For Kierkegaard's man of faith, risk and therefore passion 
were a result of the irrationality of his fundamental conviction in 
the truth of Christianity. The Christian belief-system, 
1. Ibid., p. 19. 
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Kierkegaard argued, would be rejected outright if viewed from the 
standpoint of reason alone. The risk which Kierkegaard's knight of 
faith takes is simply that he is wrong and has committed himself to 
a life of illusion. The more impossible Christianity becomes, when 
viewed from the standpoint of reason, the greater the risk and the 
more intense the passion, in this way of looking at things. But, 
we can conceive of a model of faith in which risk is involved 
without it being irrational. 
Kierkegaard is certainly correct in his claim that 
Christianity promises eternal happiness, but it can only deliver 
what it promises if its basic tenets are correct. In other words, 
we can only partake in the eternal happiness promised by 
Christianity if the world view that it encapsulates is accurate; 
if there is a God, if He is kind and loving, if Jesus was His only 
son, etc.. Let us suppose that the truth of these basic tenets of 
Christianity can be established to the satisfaction of all rational 
men; that their rationality is beyond question. Would a faith 
based upon such foundations lack passion? Kierkegaard would argue 
in the affirmative because he believes there would be no risk 
involved, but this is not strictly correct. 
To achieve eternal happiness, it is not enough for a person to 
accept the truth of Christianity. He must also act upon it. It is 
not enough, in other words, that a person believe that God exists 
and that he is good and so on, he must also endeavour to please God 
in the way that he leads his life. Christianity, after all, 
provides us with a very good example, in the form of the Devil, of 
a being who has no doubt about the existence of God, but who 
chooses to displease rather than please Him. The Christian, in 
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other words, must embark upon a Journey of faith that requires a 
conscious choice and is far from easy. But, if the Journey is 
difficult, then there is a risk of failure and the more difficult 
it is, the greater is the risk of failure and with this risk, 
surely, there must be passion. Thus, here we have a model of faith 
which involves risk and passionate comnittment, but which is 
perfectly rational. 
Furthermore, it seems a complete distortion of the nature of 
Christianity to suggest that the passion of faith is a result 
purely of risk. There are many other factors with which passion 
may be correlated. Love is an obvious example and love, both of 
God and of one's neighbour, is as much a part of Christianity as 
the promise of eternal salvation. Indeed it is precisely through 
loving God and one's neighbour that the Christian hopes to achieve 
eternal salvation. I can see no reason why a model of faith cannot 
be constructed in which the passion of faith is correlated to love 
of God. Indeed, such a model, I believe, would provide a far more 
adequate model than that of the Irrationalist. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AQUIWAS OW FAITH AWE) REASON" 
Having found the position of the Irrationalist wanting, we may 
now turn our attention, to a number of the more important 
compatibilist positions. To begin with I will outline and evaluate 
an example of what may be deemed the traditional approach to 
Christian Apologetics. More specifically, I will consider the 
position of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
My reasons for considering Aquinas, once again, are both 
historical and philosophical. 	 The historical importance of his 
position cannot be overstated. 	 It represents the dominant 
(although by no means only) line of thought within the Roman 
Catholic tradition. This is true particularly since the First 
Vatican Council (1869-1870) and the Encyclical, Aeterni Patris, of 
Pope Leo XIII (1879). This, of course, is not to say that one must 
be a Thomist in order to be a Roman Catholic, but it is fair to say 
both that Thomism enjoys a favoured position amongst Roman Catholic 
theologians and philosophers, and that certain tenets of Aquinas' 
thought are considered Roman Catholic orthodoxy. Also, Aquinas has 
been influential amongst Protestant thinkers, particularly 
Anglicans.' Thus Smart's comment that "...he is something like the 
1. See, for example, E. L. Mascall, He Who Is, (London: Longmans, 
1943). 
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'official' philosopher of a great segment of Christendom", may not 
be far from the truth.' 
Of more direct importance to us, however, is the philosophical 
importance of Aquinas' position. He is convinced of the 
rationality of Christianity and of the irrationality of scepticism. 
He argues that there is a body of evidence which settles the 
dispute between believer and sceptic, and that this evidence is 
available to any honest enquirer. On his view, it is possible to 
demonstrate the truth of at least some religious beliefs by an 
appeal to non-religious premises. It is this view that we will 
consider in more detail. 
In the Oumma Contra Gentiles, Aquinas defines his task as 
follows. 
"And so, in the divine Mercy, I have the 
confidence to embark upon the work of the wise man, 
even though this may surpass mypowers, and I have set 
myself the task of making known, as far as my limited 
powers will allow, the truth that the Catholic faith 
professes, and of setting aside the errors that are 
1. Ninian Smart, Philosophers and Religious Truth (London: SCM, 
1964), p.75. 
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opposed to it."' 
But, if one wishes to make known "the truth that the Christian 
Faith professes" and set aside "the errors that are opposed to it", 
how is one to do it? As Aquinas points out, the methods one will 
employ depend largely upon the audience for which one is writing. 
Against Jews or heretics, he suggests, one can argue through an 
appeal to the Holy Scriptures. The Jews, after all, accept the 
authority of the Old Testament and the heretics that of the New 
Testament. This method, however, is limited in that "...the 
Mohammedans and the pagans accept neither one nor the other". 2 For 
them, any appeal to the Scriptures would be useless, since they 
accept neither the authority of the old Testament nor that of the 
New. "We must, therefore", he argues, "have recourse to the 
natural reason to which all men are forced to give their assents" . 2 
A full Christian Apologetic then, must begin with an appeal to 
considerations that all men will admit as relevant. 
It is evident, that Aquinas understood the futility of a 
Christian Apologetic based upon an appeal to the authority of the 
Scriptures. Such an approach would be question begging. 
To accept anything on the authority of the Scriptures 
to accept it because God has said it; and this involves a previous 
1. St. Tnonas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Bookl, Chapter 2. 
All quotations from the Sumo Contra Gentiles cone from the 
translation by Anton C. Pegis entitled  On the Truth of the  
cahtolic Faith (Kew York: Doubleday, 1955). 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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conviction of the existence of God".1 	 Before one can accept 
anything as coming from God, one must have an antecedent belief 
that there is a God and, furthermore, that He has spoken. But, 
this is precisely what (in the modern context) the religious 
sceptic either doubts or rejects. Thus, Aquinas argues, a 
successful demonstration of the rationality of religious belief 
must meet the sceptic on his own ground; that of human reason. 
Quite clearly, then, Aquinas held that human 1 beings have a 
natural capacity to arrive at religious truth. Indeed, his claim 
that human reason, alone and unaided, can achieve knowledge of God 
is undoubtedly one of the central tenets of his whole theological 
outlook. It is, in effect, a claim that the truth of at least some 
religious beliefs can be established by methods entirely distinct 
from and independent of any appeal to Divine Revelation. 
The name which Aquinas gave to these beliefs was Fpraeambula ; _ Ifidei" (preambles or preliminaries to faith) and the name of the 
discipline, or science, whose task it was to establish the truth of 
these ipraeambula fideij was "natural theology". 	 As .the: flake 	. 
suggests, the function of thelpraeambula tidal [14as  to prepare the 
way for faith by establishing, firstly, the existence and certain 
of the attributes of God, and, secondly, the authority of the Holy 
Scriptures as the Word of God. 
Aquinas felt that we could have rational certitude (scientia) 
about the existence and certain of the attributes of God; that we 
could know, in the strictest sense of the word, that God exists. 
We Could know this because of certain demonstrative arguments which 
- 	 _ 
1. E. L. Mascall, He Who Is, p.26. 
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establish the truth of this belief. 	 The authority of the Holy 
Scriptures, on the other hand, is not established by demonstrative 
argument, he felt, but by an appeal to historical evidence. The 
1 
occurrence of miracles, thel fulfilment of the prophecies of the 
Old Testament and the conversion of the world to Christianity, he 
argued, provide strong evidence •for the authority of the Scriptures 
as the Word of God.' 
1Thus, Aquinas held that Christian apologetics must begin with 
natural theology. But, there are two Important points to make 
about this claim. The first by way of explanation and the second 
by way of expansion. 
To begin with, in claiming that natural reason establish the 
truth of thepraeambul a fidei independently of an appeal to the 
authority of the Scriptures, he is not claiming that, without 
natural theology we would be ignorant of these facts. He is not 
claiming that the truths of natural theology are not contained 
within the Scriptures. Far from it. He suggests that, if this 
were the case, there would be certain undesirable consequences.2 
Firstly, only philosophers would be aware of them since most men 
lack either the time, the disposition, or both to undertake an 
enquiry in natural theology. Furthermore, even those philosophers 
who did discover these truths would do so only after a long and 
arduous process of enquiry and, even then, some might doubt the 
veracity of their discoveries. Thus, Aquinas argues, "...the truth 
about God to which the natural reason reaches is fittingly proposed 
1.Aquinas, $umma Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 6. 
2.Ibid., Book 1, Chapter 4. 
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to men for belief".' 
This point is important because it shows that Aquinas was not 
primarily concerned with how we acquire religious beliefs but with 
how we justify them. It is not the acquisition of our belief in 
the existence of God, for example, which occurs independently of 
the Scriptures, but the justification of it. Nevertheless, he is 
A committed to accepting that knowledge of the existence of God may 
occur amongst philosophers totally ignorant of the Scriptures. 
Indeed, it is possible that he believed Aristotle to have acquired 
knowledge of God, albeit of an imperfect nature, in this manner. 
The second point that we must be aware of is that, whilst 
Aquinas held that Christian apologetics must begin with an appeal 
   
to natural reason, he also held that "...in 'divine matters, the 
natural reason has its failings". 2 Man may have a natural capacity 
to achieve knowledge of God, but this capacity is strictly limited. 
An appeal to natural reason may be a necessary feature of Christian 
,apologetics: but it is not, in itself, sufficient. There are 
certain beliefs that men must adopt if they are to achieve eternal 
salvation which completely surpass the capacity of human reason to 
comprehend, let alone demonstrate. These he called the articles of 
faith (articuli fidei). As examples we may cite the doctrines of 
the Trinity and the Incarnation. The truth of these beliefs cannot 
possibly be established independently of an appeal to Divine 
Authority. We cannot possibly know that these beliefs are true in 
the way that we could know that the preambles to faith are true. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
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We can only believe that they are true because they have been 
-revealed to us by God. W accept them in other words, on Divine 
Authority through an act of faith. Through this act of faith, we 
cone to believe that which we cannot know by independent means to 
be true. 
Thus, faith, for Aquinas, was essentially a propositional 
attitude. The man of faith was one who accepted the truth of 
certain propositions about God and His relationship to man; those 
_ 
contained within the IScriptures. But, this acceptance was not 
based upon any rational certainty, not upon any independent 
evidence. . Assent was not compelled, it was voluntary. There is, 
then, this radical distinction with Aquinas' thought between faith 
and knowledge. One person could not, simultaneously, know the 
truth of a proposition and accept it through an act of faith. To 
know that something is true is to have rational certainty about its 
truth. The man of faith does not have this certainty. 
_ Nevertheless, he believes with total 	 onviction.'1 This conviction _ 	 J 
is achieved through an act of the will aided by an act of Divine 
Grace. 
This does not mean, however, that what is an object of 
knowledge to one man cannot be an object of faith to another. The 
preambles of faith are objects of knowledge to the philosopher, 
but, they are objects of faith to everyone else. Similarly, they 
were objects of faith to the philosopher before he established 
their rational certainty through independent means. But, the 
articles of faith could not possibly be an object of knowledge to 
any man, at least in this life. They can only be accepted through 
an act of faith. 
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Natural reason cannot establish the truth of the articles of 
faith, then, but this does not mean that reason has no role to play 
with respect to them. It has a two-fold role. This involves, 
firstly, making explicit that which is contained within the Holy 
Scriptures. 	 To this process Aquinas gave the name "revealed 
theology". 	 Secondly, it is the task of reason to defend the 
propositions of revealed theology against those who consider them 
to be incoherent (3r false. Although they may be beyond the grasp 
of reason, Aquinas argues, they are still in perfect harmony with 
it. On his view, it must be rational to hold them since they are 
contained in the Holy Scriptures and, as natural theology has shown 
us, the existence of God and the authority of the Scriptures as the 
word of God cannot rationally be doubted. 
II 
This, then, is 	 the position of St. Thomas Aquinas with 
respect to the rationality of religious belief. 	 His claim is, 
quite explicitly, that religious belief is rational and that 
religious scepticism is irrational. The method he uses to 
establish this claim is simple and yet, if it works, decisive. One 
may not be able to establish the truth of all religious claims, so 
the argument goes, but we can establish that God exists and that 
the Holy Scriptures are the word of God. Furthermore we can 
establish this by methods that are open to all honest enquirers. 
Thus, even though it may be impossible to establish the truth of 
everything that is contained within the Scriptures we have good 
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reason, in fact the best possible reason, for accepting it all 
without exception. This reason is simply the authority of God. 
As attractive as it may be, however, this position is also 
problematic. Philosophers in recent times have been very quick to 
point out the difficulties inherent in attempting to prove the 
existence of God or the authority of the Scriptures. I will 
examine these difficulties in subsequent chapters but, for now, I 
wish to examine certain problems that are inherent in Aquinas' 
position even if we allow what he has to say about natural 
theology. These problems concern Aquinas' characterisation of the 
articles of faith and the relationship between the articles of 
faith and the preambles to faith. 
III 
The first problem that I wish to deal with concerns the 
characterisation, by Aquinas, of the articles of faith as above 
reason. These truths about God, he tells us, ... exceed all the 
ability of the human reason."' In saying this he wishes to exclude 
any possibility of an independent demonstration of their truth. 
The problem is to understand what his ground for this assertion is. 
The crucial factor seems to be one of our ability to 
understand the propositions in question. As one contemporary 
commentator puts it: 
1. Ibid., Book 1, Chapter 3. 
- 35 - 
"If the Trinity of Persons in God exceeds the 
capacity of human reason, it is clear that it cannot 
be understood, and, if 'kit understood, it is difficult 
to see in what sense it can be the concern of a 
science or theology. The acceptance as true of what 
is not understood is a description of faith, and this 
is clearly a different mental stance than knowledge."' 
Thus, it would seem that it is our inability to understand 
what is contained within the articles of faith that makes them 
necessarily objects of faith and not of knowledge. We accept them 
as coming from God and so we believe that they are true. But, we 
could not have been aware of them had they not been revealed by God 
and now that we are aware of them, we cannot demonstrate their 
truth independently of an appeal to the authority of God. We 
cannot do this because we cannot comprehend them, we cannot 
understand what they mean. 
This way of understanding the articles of faith is now 
normative within the Roman Catholic church. They are referred to 
as 'mysteries', truths that "... the human reason itself is 
incapable of discovering or of comprehending when it has 
ascertained it". 2 But, it is difficult to reconcile with other 
1. Ralph McInerney, St Thomas Aquinas, (Boston: Twayne, 1977), 
p.14. 
2. Rev. George D. Smith, "Faith and Revealed Truth", in Ike 
Teaching of the Catholic Church, ed George D. Smith (London: 
Burn and Oates, 1952), p.7. 
- 36 - 
things that Aquinas wishes to say about the articles of faith. In 
particular, it is difficult to reconcile with his understanding of 
the articles of faith as forming the premises upon which revealed 
theology is built. 
The articles of faith, we are told, are revealed to us by God 
and they are revealed to us for a purpose. 	 But, what is this 
purpose? Aquinas offers an answer to this question in the very 
first article of his Suuna Theologica. Here he states that: 
"God destines for us an end beyond the grasp of 
reason; according to Isaiah, Eye hath not seen, 0 God, 
without thee what thou bast prepared for them that 
love thee. Now we have to recognise an end before we 
can stretch out and exert ourselves for it. Hence the 
necessity for our welfare that the divine truths 
surpassing reason should be signified to us through 
divine revelation."' 
This would seem to imply that the articles of faith convey 
information that is necessary for our salvation. But, how can this 
be if we cannot possibly understand them? What information can 
possibly be conveyed to me by a proposition that I not only do not, 
but, cannot possibly comprehend? Aquinas offers the following 
suggestion: 
"It is also necessary that such truth be proposed 
to men for belief so that they may have a truer 
knowledge of God. For then only do we know God truly 
1. Aquinas, aumma_laleologiaa, la,1,1. 	 All quotations from the 
Surma Theologica come from the Blackfriars edition. 
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when we believe Him to be above everything that it is 
possible for man to think about Him; for, as we have 
shown, the divine substance surpasses the natural 
knowledge of which man is capable. Hence, by the fact 
that some things about God are proposed to man that 
surpass his reason, there is strengthened in man the 
view that God is something above what he can think."' 
The articles of faith, it would appear, individually convey no 
specific information to us. Collectively, however, they convey to 
us the general information that our capacity to understand God is 
limited; 	 that we can form no concept of God as He is in His 
essence. 	 In this way, revelation of them has certain beneficial 
effects.2 Not only do they make us see more clearly that God's 
nature is ultimately incomprehensible to us, but they also teach us 
humility and instil in us a hope for greater knowledge and 
understanding of God in the life to come. 
But, this, surely, is not all that the articles of faith can 
convey to us. At least, not if we are to accept Aquinas' 
understanding of the nature and scope of revealed theology. This 
• understanding assigns to it the task of expressing and elaborating 
the articles of faith. 
Christian theology, Aquinas tells us in the Summa Theologica, 
is a science. Like all sciences it starts from first principles. 
But, unlike other sciences, it "...takes on faith its principles 
1.Aquinas, $umma Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 5. 
2.Ibid. 
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revealed by God".' Furthermore, the "...first principles of this 
science are the articles of faith, and faith is about God".2 
Christian theology, then, begins with the articles of faith but its 
tasks is not to establish their truth. 	 It does not, to quote 
Aquinas, "...argue to establish its premises,..., but advances from 
them to make something known".2 But, it is difficult to see how 
this is possible if the articles of faith are completely beyond our 
/grasp, completely beyond our power to comprehend. 0. 
It is difficult to see, then, how Aquinas can consistently 
assert that the articles of faith are completely beyond our ability 
to comprehend. If this where the case, then they could convey no 
specific information to. us. But, if they can convey no information 
to us, then how is a revealed theology whose task it is to express 
and elaborate the articles of faith possible? Revealed theology 
would, of necessity, consist merely of restating verbatim what was 
contained in the scriptures in a way that would exclude any 
possibility of elaboration of explanation. 
To be consistent, then, it seems that Aquinas must admit that 
we can comprehend, in no matter how limited a form, the articles of 
faith. But, if he does this, then it is difficult to see what it 
is that distinguishes them sufficiently from the preambles to faith 
to make our inability to demonstrate their truth a matter of 
principle and not of fact. 
1.Aquinas, aunma_Thealogica., la,1,2. 
2.Ibid., la,1,7. 
3.Ibid., la,1,6. 
- 39 - 
To begin with, it cannot be that we have full understanding of 
the preambles to faith. Aquinas, rightly, is adamant that we do 
not. The preambles, even though they are open to independent 
demonstration, are still propositions about God. Our understanding 
of them, therefore, will be as limited as our understanding of the 
nature of God. We can, for example, have no fuller understanding 
of the proposition, "God exists", than our understanding of "God" 
allows. Since we cannot understand God as He is in His essence, 
our understanding of "God" is necessarily limited, There can, 
therefore, be no question of a full understanding of propositions 
such as, "God exists". 
Our understanding of the preambles to faith, then, is 
necessarily United, even though they are susceptible to 
demonstrative proof. Now, if I am right, and Aquinas must accept 
that we are capable of some, albeit limited, understanding of the 
(- 
articles of faith, why is it that their undemonstrability is a 
matter of principle and not of fact? I can see no satisfactory 
answer to this question. If demonstrability is a function of our 
ability to understand then, it seens to me, Aquinas is committed to 
accepting either that both the articles and the preambles are, in 
principle if not in fact, open to demonstrative proof or that, as a 
matter of principle, neither the articles nor the preambles are 
open to demonstrative proof. Neither option seems acceptable to 
Aquinas. 
The claim, then, that the articles of faith are above reason 
is problematic because it is not clear what it is about them that 
distinguishes them from the preambles to faith sufficiently to make 
their truth, as a matter of principles, undenonstrable. 
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17" 
The second problem that I wish to consider concern's Aquinas' 
claim that, even though the articles of faith are above reason, 
they are, nevertheless, in harmony with it. It is, quite clearly, 
an assertion that, whilst the truth of the articles cannot be 
demonstrated, neither can it be demonstrated that they are false. 
The problem is, initially, to understand what, exactly, it is that 
he is asserting. Is it the strong claim that no argument could 
possibly show that the articles are false, or the somewhat weaker 
claim that no actual argument is successful? 
This question is dealt with most explicitly in the Summa  
Contra Gentiles.' His position here appears to be the strong one. 
that no argument brought against the articles could possibly be 
successful. He states quite categorically that "... whatever 
arguments are brought forward against the doctrines of faith are 
conclusions incorrectly derived from the first and self-evident 
principles, imbedded in nature". 2 No such argument can, therefore, 
work and so, "...there exists the possibility to answer them".
He is, in effect, dismissing, a priori, any possibility of an 
argument which is brought against the articles of faith being 
conclusive. This does not mean that the theologian has no duty to 
show why particular arguments do not work. He does, but only so 
that the falsehood is not perpetuated. The theologian who is 
1. Aquinas, Eumma Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 7. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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grappling with such arguments, however, is justified in an a prior 
conviction that the arguments in question will not work. But why 
Is this? Aquinas offers the following reason: 
'Now, although the truth of the Christian faith 
which we have discussed surpasses the capacity of the 
reason, nevertheless, that truth that the human reason 
is naturally endowed to know cannot be opposed to the 
truth of the Christian faith. For that with which the 
human reason is naturally endowed is clearly most 
true; so much so, that it is impossible for us to 
think of such truths as false. Nor is it permissible 
to believe as false that which we hold by faith, since 
this is confirmed in a way that is so clearly divine. 
Since, therefore, only the false is opposed to the 
true, as is clearly evident from an examination of 
their definitions, it is impossible that the truth of 
faith should be opposed to those principles that the 
human reason knows naturally."' 
This argument can be summarised into the following 
propositions: 
What human reason tells us is true must be true 
	  (1) 





Therefore, there can be no conflict between that which human 
reason tells us is true and that which we accept in faith 
  (3) 
Like any argument, this one is no stronger than its premises 
and the crucial one, it seems to me, is ...(2). The first, it is 
true, reveals an unfashionable and without doubt unwarranted 
optimism about the power of human reason to achieve truth. It 
implies that we can achieve absolute certainty about the truth of 
many non-trivial propositions. It is this kind of certainty that 
Aquinas thought could be achieved about the existence of God. The 
reference here, however, is not so much to propositions for which 
we can have demonstrative certainty, but to the self-evident 
propositions (principia per se nota) from which they were derived. 
Aquinas was concerned with showing that nothing could be derived 
from these principle that is contrary to the truth of faith. 
Having noted this, we can proceed to the second and more important 
premiss. 
The second premiss states that we are not permitted to believe 
false, that which we hold in faith. The strength of the whole 
argument, it seems to me, depends upon how we are to interpret this 
claim. Why is it that we are not 'permitted' to believe false that 
which we hold in faith? There are two possible answers, only one 
of which will do if the argument is to hold any strength. 
The first way of interpreting ...(2) pertains to the 
psychological certainty that Aquinas held accompanied assent to 
propositions in faith. Faith, he held, was characterised by a 
conscious act of assent. This assent was what he called the inner 
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act of faith, that of belief<credere) 	 This he distinguished 
from other acts of assent. 
"Among acts of the intellect, some include a firm 
assent without pondering - thus when someone thinks 
about what he knows scientifically or intuitively; 
thinking of that kind reaches a finished term. Other 
mental acts are marked by a pondering that is 
inconclusive, lacking firm assent, either because the 
act leans towards neither of the alternatives, the 
case with doubt; or because it leans to one 
alternative, but only tentatively - the case with 
suspicion; or because it decides for the one side but 
with fear of the opposite - the case with opinion. 
The act of believing, however, is firmly attached to 
one alternative and in this respect the believer is in 
the same state of mind as one who has science or 
understanding. Yet, the believer's knowledge is not 
completed by a clear vision, and in this respect he is 
like one having a doubt, a suspicion, or an opinion."' 
Faith, then, is characterised by wholehearted assent and, in 
this it differs from doubt, suspicion and opinion. 	 The man of 
faith has total conviction concerning the truth of what he 
believes. But, the conviction is derived neither from the rational 
certainty of what is believed nor from its self-evidence. 	 The 
assent that occurs in an act of faith is uncompelled, it is 
1. Aquinas, Sunim_Thecangiol, 2a,2ae,1. 
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voluntary. The certainty which one has in faith is, therefore, of 
a purely psychological nature. 
Now, if we interpret ...(2) as refering to the psychological 
certainty that accompanies an act of faith, then, the argument 
holds little water. On this understanding of ...(2), the claim 
that we are not permitted to believe as false that which we accept 
In faith amounts to a claim that to do so would be to lose faith. 
If one begins to doubt, then one can no longer be said to have 
faith. But, if this is all that is being asserted in ...(2), then 
the only conclusion that we are entitled to draw from Aquinas' 
argument is that we cannot, without losing faith, accept that there 
is any conflict between faith and reason. We cannot conclude, as 
Aquinas clearly wants to, that there can be no conflict between 
faith and reason. 
It would seem, then, that we must interpret ...(2) in a 
different manner if it is to hold any water. We need to interpret 
It as asserting not just that we must not doubt what we hold in 
faith but that we are not entitled to. 	 Why, then, are we not 
entitled to doubt what we hold in faith? 	 Because, it is 
...confirmed in a way so clearly divine"; because we hold it on 
the authority of God. 
If we interpret the argument in this way, and it appears that 
we must, then it must be seen as an appeal to Divine Authority. 
Indeed, it seems only natural for Aquinas to argue in this way. 
Since the truth of the articles of faith can only be established 
through an appeal to Divine Authority, it seems only natural that 
It should be safeguarded in the same manner. His claim, then, that 
the articles of faith are in harmony with reason amounts to a claim 
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that, since they have been revealed to us by God, they cannot be 
false. 
This argument is decisive, but only if the articles of faith 
have indeed been revealed to us by God and only if we are entitled 
to believe this. The argument is only as strong as Aquinas' 
conviction that God exists and that the articles of faith have been 
revealed to us by God is rational. 
The third problem that I wish to deal with concerns the 
epistemic status that Aquinas wishes to ascribe to the articles of 
faith. As we have seen, he felt that they could only be justified 
by an appeal to the authority of the Scriptures. Furthermore, it 
is through such an appeal that Aquinas safeguards their truth. His 
assertion that they are in harmony with reason, ultimately rests 
upon it. frhe\problem is to understand the degree to which Aquinas 
felt that an appeal to Divine Authority is rational. 
In this chapter I have interpreted him as asserting that it 
was rational in a fairly strong sense. This seems to me to be the 
natural way to interpret his position. But, as we shall see, it is 
not altogether unproblematic. It seems to me that Aquinas himself 
was not altogether clear about his position or if he was, he does 
not state it unambiguously. 
There can be little doubt that Aquinas felt that we can assert 
the existence of God with complete certainty. Each of the famous 
Five Ways ends with a clear affirmation of the existence of God. 
And, if this were not enough, he then goes on to establish certain 
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of the attributes of God. 	 There can be little doubt that he 
believed that the being whose existence the enterprise of natural 
theology affirms is the Christian God. But, this, it will be 
remembered, is only one part of his apologetics. The second part 
was to establish the authority of the Scriptures. This he does by 
an appeal to historical evidence. The difficulty is to understand 
what epistemic status Aquinas wished to give this evidence.' 
Aquinas is far from consistent on this point. Inrihe First Part 
of the Summa Theologica, for example, he states that if "...an 
opponent believes nothing of what has been divinely revealed, then 
no way lies open for making the articles of faith reasonably 
credible; 	 all that can be done is to solve the difficulties 
against faith he may bring up".2 However, in Question 5 of the 
Secunda Secundae he commits himself unequivocally to the view that 
the evidence in question can compel assent.3 He does so for he 
must account for the belief of a group of beings, the devils, who 
e accept this evidence but do so unwillingly and without grace." 
Thus, it seems reasonable to interpret him as giving the evidence 
in question a very strong epistemic status. This interpretation is 
1.See Terence Penelhum, "The Analysis of Faith in St. Thomas 
Aqutnas", Religious Studies, 13 (June 1977), p.144; and John 
Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 2^c1 ed.(Glasgow: Fontana, 1974), 
p.17. 
2.Aquinas, Summa_TILesapaca, la,1,8. 
3.Penelhum, "The Analysis of Faith in St. Thomas Aquinas", 
p.145. 
4.Ibid. 
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given added weight if we consider the following words of one of the 
more influential of modern Thomists, Etienne Gilson: 
"...we begin to discern the general features of a 
third position on the problem, as well as of a third 
spiritual family, that of the Thomists. All its 
members will grant that there is a true Revelation: 
the Christian Revelation. They grant it, but they do 
not take it for granted. No man would ever admit God 
has spoken, unless he had solid proofs of the fact. 
Such proofs are to be found in history, where the 
miracles of God, and quite especially the greatest of 
all: the life and growth of His Church, prove his 
presence, the truth of His Doctrine and the permanence 
of His inspiration. If truly God has spoken, His 
Revelation must needs be true, and it is necessary for 
us to believe it."' 
But, whilst it is natural to interpret Aquinas as asserting 
that the evidence in question is rationally compelling, it is also 
problematic. The problem lies in the apparent inconsistency •of 
this claim with other aspects of his analysis of faith.2 
Faith, it will be remembered, involved, for Aquinas, assent to 
propositions in a wholehearted manner. 	 In this way it differed 
from doubt, suspicion and opinion and [resembled ' rational _ 
1.Etienne Gibson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, (New 
York: Scribners, 1939), p.81-2. 
2.Penelhum, "The Analysis of Faith in St. Thomas Aquinas", 
p.144. 
- 48- 
certitude. Doubt, suspicion and opinion all involved assent, but 
without conviction. But, it differed from scientia and resembled 
- 
the others in that the assent was not compelled by the evidence. 
Where assent was compelled by the evidence, it was involuntary and 
there could be no merit attached to it. This was the case with 
scientia, but it was not the case with faith. Assent in faith was 
not compelled by the evidence and was, therefore voluntary and, 
hence, meritorious.' 
We are, then faced with a dilemma, Aquinas asserts that if 
faith is to be meritorious, it must be uncompelled. But, he also 
asserts or at least appears to, that the evidence which establishes 
the authority of the Scriptures is compelling. He cannot, 
consistently, hold both. If the evidence is compelling, then it is 
difficult to see how assent to the articles of faith through an act 
of faith can have a great deal of merit attached to it. If the 
evidence is not compelling, then it is difficult to see in what 
sense assent to the articles of faith can be rational, or, at 
least, any more rational than doubt or outright rejection. 
NT 
There are, it would seem, problems with Aquinas' position, but 
let us overlook them and assume that they are not insurmountable. 
Our next task, then, must be to examine the process of natural 
1. Aquinas, $umna Theologica, 2a,2ae,9. 
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theology. 	 Its first task, as have seen, was to establish the 
existence of God through the process of demonstrative argument. I 
will consider two of the more important arguments; the Ontological 
and the Cosmological. 
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The Ontological Argument for the existence of God is an 
attempt to demonstrate that God exists by methods that are purely a 
priori. As such, it makes absolutely no appeal to experience, but 
argues from what it takes to be the believer's concept of God to an 
affirmation of His existence. It claims, in other words, to show 
that no-one with a proper concept of God can rationally doubt that 
He exists.' 
The argument originates with Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033- 
1109) and has fascinated philosophers ever since. Anselnes 
formulation remains the most famous and widely discussed today, 
although many other famous philosophers, including Descartes, 
Leibniz and Spinoza, have formulated versions of it. It has also 
had its critics. The first of these was Gaunilo, a contemporary of 
Anselm's. His critique of the argument, together with Anselmes 
reply to it, have survived. They afford added insight into how we 
are to understand Anselm's position. Saint Thomas Aquinas also 
criticised a version of the Argument in his Sumna Theologica, but 
the most celebrated critique is, without doubt, that of Immanuel 
Kant. Indeed, it is often suggested that Kant's criticism of the 
argument, embodied in the famous claim that existence /is not a 
1. Richard Taylor, "Introduction", in Ihe_Quipingicial_Argumeat, 
ed. Alvin Plantinga (London: Macmillan, 1968) p.vii. 
• 
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'real predicate', is fatal to it. 
The Ontological Argument, however, is far from dead. There 
have been a number of attempts to reformulate the argument in 
modern times. The most celebrated of these are the versions put 
forward by Norman Malcolm and Charles Hartshorne. Both of these 
philosophers have argued that Anselm, in his Proslogion, presents 
us with not one, but two versions of the Ontological Argument. The 
first of these is the one that is usually discussed and is to be 
found in the second chapter of the Proslogion. I will refer to it 
as the Proslogion II argument. The second is to be found in the 
third chapter of the Proslogion and in his reply to Gaunilo. 	 I 
will refer to it as the Proslogion III argument. 	 There is no 
evidence to suggest that Anselm distinguished between the two. 
Nevertheless, both Malcolm and Hartshorne argue that the two are 
distinct and that, whilst the first may not be sound, the second 
is. 	 Contemporary debate has, accordingly, shifted to an 
examination of this new claim. 	 I will begin, however, with an 
examination of the Proslogion II argument and the classical 
critique of it, since an understanding of it is important if we are 
to understand the contemporary debate. 
Anselm opens the second chapter of the Proslogion, titled 
"That God truly exists", by outlining what he takes to be the 
ordinary believer's understanding of God. 
"Well then, Lord, You who give understanding to 
faith, grant me that I may understand, as much as You 
- 52 - 
see fit, that You exist as we believe You to exist, and 
that You are what we believe You to be. Now we believe 
that You are something than which nothing greater can 
be thought." , 
This conception of God as 'something-than-which-nothing-
greater-can-be-thought', as the greatest possible being, is an 
indispensible part of his argument. He argues that, to understand 
God in this fashion, is to see that there can be absolutely no 
doubt concerning His existence. Notice, however, that this 
conception of God is distinct from the Augustinian conception of 
God as one 'than whom there is nothing superior'. 2 Anselm's claim 
is that God is not just the greatest actually existing being, but 
the greatest possible being. The point is an important one. 
Although it is true by definition that the greatest actually 
existing being exists, there can be no guarantee that this being is 
God. In formulating his definition of "God", Anselm was trying to 
give a precise expression of the ordinary believer's understanding 
of God as the only proper object of worship. 2 If God were to be 
understood as the greatest actually existing being, then it is 
conceivable that some being should approach God in greatness and 
1. Saint Anselm, Proslogion, 2. 
All quotations come from M.J. Charlesworth, St. Anselm's  
Proslogion (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965). 
2. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v., "Ontological Argument 
for the Existence of God" by John Hick. 
3. Terence Penelhum, Religion and Rationality (New York: Random 
House, 1971), p.13. 
- 53 - 
even that, in the future, some being night surpass Him. But, if 
we see God as the greatest possible being, then there is no 
possibility of this. Nothing could ever approach God with respect 
to greatness and nothing could, therefore, be a more proper object 
of worship. 
This, however, raises a problem for Anselm. How does one know 
that such a being exists? What does one say to the Fool of the 
Psalms who says in his heart that there is no God? Anselm's answer 
to this question is that, if we understand God as the greatest 
possible being, then we will see that He could not fail to exist. 
His argument for this conclusion goes through two distinct 
stages. 	 The first stage is an attempt to demonstrate that the 
greatest conceivable being exists in the mind. 	 The second, more 
important stage, argues that, if this is the case, it is self-
defeating to claim that it exists in the mind alone. We must 
admit, in other words, that the greatest conceivable being exists 
both in the mind and in reality. 
This distinction between existence in the mind (in intellectu) 
and actual existence, or existence in reality (in re), seems an odd 
one. It would appear to imply a distinction between two distinct 
modes or levels of existence. The point that Anselm is making when 
he draws this distinction, however, is fairly straightforward. He 
is simply drawing our attention to the difference between 
formulating a concept and knowing that something corresponding to 
that concept actually exists. The mere fact that we have a concept 
does not guarantee that anything in reality corresponds to that 
concept. A painter, to use Anselm's example, caD plan a picture 
before he actually paints it. He can, in other words, form a 
concept of what the picture he is going to paint will be like. 
When he does this, the picture is said by Anselm to exist in the 
mind, but not yet in reality. When he sits down and paints the 
picture, it will exist both in the mind and in reality. This point 
can be seen even more clearly if we examine Anselues argument for 
the conclusion that the greatest conceivable being exists in the 
mind. 
"Even the Fool, then, is forced to agree that 
something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought 
exists in the mind, since he understands this when he 
hears it, and whatever is understood is in the mind."' 
Whatever is understood, Anselm tells us, is in the mind. This 
proposition appears to be tautological for him. If some word or 
phrase is understood, then the thing to which it refers is said by 
him to exist in the mind. It may not exist in reality, the thing 
to which it refers may not be a real object, but we can imagine 
what it would be like if it did. 	 We can, other words, form a 
coherent concept of it. 	 If, then, we hear of unicorns being 
referred to as single horned creatures resembling horses, and we 
understand this description, unicorns will be said by Anselm to 
exist in the mind even though there may not be any real as opposed 
to imaginary unicorns. Similarly, if we hear of God being 
described as something-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought, and 
we understand this description, then God will be said by Anselm to 
exist in the mind. Row, Anselm had little doubt that even the Fool 
would understand this description of God when he heard it and so he 
1. Anselm, FroslogionL, 2. 
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concluded that even the Fool must admit that God exists in the 
mind. 
It is clear, then, that for Anselm this first stage of the 
argument was trivial. Its task was merely to lay the foundation 
for the second and more important stage. He merely assumed that 
his formula was a coherent one and that no-one would really doubt 
that this was the case. It is by no means clear, however, that he 
was entitled to make this assumption and we will have occasion to 
call it into question later. To say, however, that God exists in 
the mind is one thing, but to say that He also exists in reality is 
another. How, then, does Anselm make the transition? 
"And surely that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-
thought cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it 
exists solely in the mind even, it can thought to exist 
in reality also, which is greater. If then that-than-
which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in the mind 
alone, this sane that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-
thought is that-than-which-a-greater-can-be-thought. 
But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is 
absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-
greater-cannot-be-thought exists both in the mind and 
in reality."' 
Anselm, then, wishes to argue that it is self-defeating to 
assert that the greatest conceivable being exists in the mind 
alone; that we can formulate a coherent concept of such a being 
but that the concept is not instantiated. If this were the case, 
1. Ibid. 
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then our concept would not be of the greatest conceivable being for 
we can conceive of it as existing both in the mind and in reality 
and this is greater than existing in the mind alone. The greatest 
possible being, then, is one that, as a matter of necessity, exists 
both in the mind and in reality. 
The argument is ingenious, but it leaves us feeling somewhat 
uneasy. We feel that it must be mistaken somewhere, but it is not 
so easy to see where. This feeling is well sunned up by Mascall. 
"The reaction that most people feel when they are 
first confronted with this example of the reductio ad 
absurdum is very similar to that which they feel when 
they see a conjurer extract a rabbit from an apparently 
empty hat. They cannot explain how the rabbit got 
there, but they are pretty certain that the conjurer 
introduced it somehow."' 
The trick, we feel, lies somewhere in the transition from 
conceptual reality to actual reality; from what can be conceived 
to exist, to what actually exists. Is it legitimate,to 'Move purely 
from the examination of a concept to an assertion that the concept 
is instantiated, as Anselm does in the second 6thge, of his 
argument? Moreover, can we really form a coherent concept of 
'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived', as Anselm 
claims in the first stage, of his argument? Traditional critiques 
of the Ontological Argument have centred around these two 
questions, and it is to them that we will now turn. 2 
1. Mascall, He Who Is, p.32. 
2. Penelhum, Religion and Rationality, p.134. 
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The first question I wish to consider concerns the coherence, 
or otherwise, of Anselm's formula. Is it really true, as Anselm 
assumes, that even the Fool will understand the phrase "something-
than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought", when he hears it? It is 
interesting to note that his first critic, Gaunilo, a believer 
writing on behalf of the Fool, questions him precisely upon this 
point. 
"...upon hearing it spoken of I can so little 
think or entertain in my mind this being (that which is 
greater than all those others that are able to be 
thought of, and which it is said can be none other than 
God Himself) in terns of an object known to me either 
by species or genus, as I can think of God Himself, 
whom indeed for this very reason I can even think does 
not exist. For neither do I know the reality itself, 
nor can I form an idea from some other things like it 
since, as you say yourself, it is such that nothing 
could be like it."' 
Gaunilo, then, points to the uniqueness of the being described 
by Anselm's formula and asks whether we can really formulate a 
coherent concept of such a being. It is an important point. We 
formulate concepts by reference to objects around us. But, the 
being to which Anselm refers is said to be unique. How, then, can 
we formulate a clear idea or concept of it? Moreover, if this 
cannot be done, how is it possible to affirm that something 
1. Gaunilo, A Reply on Behalf of the Fool, 4. Quotations are from 
Charlesworth, Et. Anselm's Proslogioa. 
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corresponds to the concept? The point is an especially acute one 
when we consider that Anselm argues that this affirmation could be 
achieved purely by an examination of the concept in question. 
Having made this point, Gaunilo goes on to distinguish between 
three ways in which a person can be said to understand a particular 
phrase or proposition.' (i) He can understand the words employed 
without comprehending their real meaning and, therefore, without 
understanding that what they signify actually exists. (ii) He can 
understand the words employed and comprehend their real, meaning, 
but without understanding that what they signify actually exists. 
(iii) He can understand the words employed, comprehend their real 
meaning and understand that what they signify actually exists. 
Now, Anselm, in the first stage of his argument, assumed that his 
formula could, at the very least, be understood in the second of 
these three ways. The Fool, he believes, understands what is meant 
by "God" but rejects His actual existence. He then goes on to 
argue, in the second stage of the argument, that he cannot do this 
without contradiction. Gaunilo, however, argues that the formula 
can only be understood in the first and most trivial way. But, if 
this is the case, then the Ontological Argument does not get off 
the ground. If I cannot really understand the word "God", then 
there is no real sense in which God can be said to exist in the 
mind and I cannot, therefore, argue from this to God's actual 
existence. 
This question of our ability to understand, in any real sense, 
Anselm's formula has subsequently been taken up by a number of 
1. Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion, p.87. 
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writers. Many have argued that the formula is incoherent. One of 
the most succinct critiques is, without doubt, that of C.D. Broad.' 
He raises a number of serious problems which cause him to doubt 
whether the formula is a coherent one. 
Broad begins by pointing to an ambiguity within the formula. 
The phrase "most perfect (conceivable being", he tells us, can be 
interpreted in either of two ways. The first is what he calls the 
comparative interpretcAio. 51 , !:1;? thci phrEale is 
equivalent to "a being such that nothing more perfect is logically 
possible". The second way he calls the positive interpretation. 
On this i:rpretation, the phrase is equivalent to "a being which 
ha!-.; n11 positive powers and qualities to the highest possible 
degree". He then goes on to argue that unless all positive 
characteristics are mutually compatible, neither interpretation 
will do. His argument proceeds as follows: 
Suppose, for example that it was impossible for an extended 
substance to be conscious and for a conscious substance to be 
extended. If this were the case, then it would be impossible for 
there to be a substance with all positive properties and, 
therefore, the phrase "a being which has all positive powers and 
qualities to the highest possible degree" would be so much 
"meaningless verbiage". The positive interpretation, then, would 
be incoherent. But this, he tells us, is also true of the 
1. C.D. Broad, "A Critique of the Ontologicial Argument", in 
Philosophy of Religion: Selected Reading, eds. William I. Rowe 
and Wiliam J. Wainwright (New York: Harcourt, Bruce, 
Jovanovich, 1973). 
- 60 - 
comparative interpretation. 
Let us suppose this tine, that there are three and only three 
positive properties; X,Y,Z. Furthermore, that any two of these 
are compatible but that the presence of any two excludes the third. 
Now, Broad argues, if this is the case, then we would have not one 
most perfect being, but three most perfect beings. The phrase, 
"the most perfect 	 (conceivable) 	 being", 	 then, 	 would be 
inappropriate. 	 We would need to talk of "the most perfect 
(conceivable) beings". 
It is clear, then, that nothing can answer to the phrase "mast 
perfect (conceivable) being" unless all positive characteristics 
are compatible. It is equally clear that nothing can answer to the 
comparative interpretation unless it also answered to the positive 
interpretation. For, if we conceived of a being that did not have 
all positive characteristics, it would be logically possible to 
conceive of another being that had all the characteristics of the 
first together with some that the first lacked. 
It is of absolute importance, then, that all positive 
characteristics be shown to be mutually compatible. But, Broad 
goes on to argue, even if this can be shown it must also be shown 
that all positive attributes have intrinsic maximums or upper 
limits of degree. If they do not, then the phrase "most perfect 
[conceivable] being" is as meaningless as the phrase "highest 
I — 
possible integer". Moreover, it is not absolutely clear that they 
do. Positive properties such as length, temperature or pain, for 
example, do not seem to have any intrinsic maximum or upper limit 
of degree. 
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This argument of Broad's is masterful. 	 The question of 
whether or not Anselm's formula can be understood in any sense 
other than the trivial one that Gaunilo pointed to is by no means 
an unproblematic one. Broad has shown us a number of very strong 
reasons why this is the case. He has not, however, shown us that 
the formula is an incoherent one. Anselm might reply in one of two 
ways. Firstly, he could argue that his formula needs to be 
understood in some sense other than the two which Broad points out. 
Secondly, he could argue that, contrary to Broad's suspicions, all 
positive charateristics are mutually compatible and do have an 
intrinsic maximum or upper limit of degree. I am not sure just how 
he could go about either of these two tasks but, equally, I am not 
sure how one could rule out either possibility. 
Anselm, then, is faced with a problem that haunts all theists; 
that of giving sense to any assertion or statement about God. But, 
it seems to me, Anselm is faced with this problem in a particularly 
acute fashion. Broad, as we have seen, argued that unless all 
positive characteristics are mutually compatible and have an 
intrinsic maximum or upper limit of degree, the term "most perfect 
being" is an incoherent one. It is incumbent upon Anselm, then, to 
show that they are, or alternatively, that his formula can be given 
another meaningful interpretation before he can go on to argue that 
God exists. This is because his method is purely a priori, 
proceeds purely by an examination of the implications of what he 
takes to be the believer's concept of God. Someone like Aquinas, 
however, who argues a posteriori from certain features of the world 
to the existence of God is not faced with this problem in as acute 
a fashion. It seems possible for him to accept that our concept of 
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God is incomplete but is, nevertheless, sufficient for us to 
demonstrate that a being exists who can reasonably be identified as 
God. If, then, our concept of God is such that it requires all 
positive characteristics to be mutually compatible and capable of 
an intrinsic maximum or upper degree, since we have good reason to 
believe that God exists, we have good reason to believe that they 
are. It is interesting to note that Gaunilo appears to make a 
similar point; 
"That is why it must first be conclusively proved 
by argument that there is some higher nature, ..., so 
that we can also infer everything else which 
necessarily cannot be wanting to what is greater and 
better than everything."' 
III 
Our second question concerned the transition from the 
conceptual to the real. If we grant that the concept of 
"something-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought" is a coherent 
one, can we really establish purely by examining the logical 
implications of this concept, that this being actually exists? Our 
instinctive reaction is to say no, but a purely instinctive 
rejection of his argument is not likely to trouble Anselm too much. 
He would agree that this step is one that we would not normally be 
justified in taking, but would argue that in this one case, of the 
greatest conceivable being, it is one that we must make. The 
1. Gaunilo, A Reply on Behalf of the Fool, 4. 
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debate between Anselm and Gaunilo is, once again, informative on 
this point. 
Gaunilo begins his critique of Anselm on this point by 
isolating what he takes to be the crucial premise in Anselm's 
argument. 
"That, however, (this nature) necessarily exists 
in reality is demonstrated to me from the fact that, 
unless it existed, whatever exists in reality would be 
greater than it and consequently it would not be that 
which is greater than everything that undoubtedly had 
already been proved to exist in the mind".' 
Gaunilo is, quite clearly, correct. 	 Anselm does make the 
transition from the claim that the greatest conceivable being 
exists in the mind to the claim that it also exists in reality 
through an implicit assumption that it is greater to exist both in 
the mind and in reality than in the mind alone.2 It is only on the 
basis of this proposition that Anselm is able to conclude that it 
is self-defeating—to claim that the greatest conceivable being 
exists in the mind alone. Given that it is greater to exist both 
in the mind and in reality than in the mind alone, the greatest 
conceivable being could not possibly exist in the mind alone. The 
central question, then, concerns the admissability or otherwise of 
this premise. Gaunilo argues that it is I:inadmissible since we 
could employ it to demonstrate the existence not only of God, but 
1.Ibid., 5. 
2.This point is made forcefully by Charlesworth, St. Anselm's  
Froslogion, p.59. 
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of any number of things. 
"For example: they say that there is in the ocean 
somewhere an island which, because of the difficulty 
(or rather the impossibility) of finding that which 
does not exist, some have called the 'Lost Island'. 
And the story goes that it is blessed with all manner 
of priceless riches and delights in abundance, much 
more even than the Happy Isles, and, having no owner or 
inhabitant, it is superior everywhere in abundance of 
riches to all those other lands that men inhabit. Now, 
if anyone tell(s) me that it is like this, I shall 
easily understand what is said, since nothing is 
difficult about it. But if he should then go on to 
say, as though it were a logical consequence of this: 
You cannot any more doubt that this island that is more 
excellent than all other lands truly exists somewhere 
in reality than you can doubt that it is in your mind; 
and since it is more excellent to exist not only in the 
mind alone but also in reality, therefore it must needs 
be that it exists. For if it did not exist, any other 
land existing in reality would be more excellent than 
it, and so this island, already conceived by you to be 
more excellent than others, will not be more 
excellent."' 
Gaunilo, then, uses Anselm's reasoning to demonstrate the 
existence of an island "more excellent than all other lands". His 
1. Gaunilo, A Reply on Behalf of the Fool, 6. 
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example, however, is unfortunate. 	 Anselm's argument, after all, 
was intended to demonstrate the existence of a being greater than 
any other conceivable, not actual, being. Nevertheless, we can 
easily reformulate the argument to take this discrepency into 
account. The argument would now be that, since it is greater to 
exist both in the mind and in reality, the greatest conceivable 
island would, of necessity, exist in reality if it exists in the 
mind. But, as Gaunilo points out, this argument is readily seen to 
be absurd. 
"If, I say, someone wishes to •persuade me that 
this island really exists beyond all doubt, I should 
either think that he was Joking, or I should find it 
hard to decide which of us I ought to Judge the bigger 
fool - I, if I agreed with him, or he, if he thought 
that he had proved the existence of this island with 
any certainty."' 
Anselm's reply to this argument of Gaunilo's is as follows: 
"Now, I truly promise that if anyone should 
discover for me something existing either in reality or 
in the mind alone - except that-than-which-a-greater-
cannot-be-thought - to which the logic of my argument 
would apply, then I shall find that Lost Island and 
give it, never more to be lost, to that person."2 
1.Ibid. 
2.Anselm,The Author's Reply to Gaunilo,3. 	 Quoted from 
Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion. 
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Anselm, then, stands by the logic of his argument, but seems 
to be denying that it applies to any case except that of 
'something-than-which-more-greater-can-be-thought'. But why need 
this be the case? If we can really formulate a coherent concept of 
an island more perfect than any other conceivable island and if 
actual existence really is a perfection, why should we be 
prohibited from concluding that such an island truly exists? 
Anselm's answer, presumably, would be that an island is a finite 
thing and that even the most perfect conceivable island would 
contain only a finite number of perfections. Just which 
perfections such an island would have, therefore, would be a matter 
of conjecture. Equally, it would be a matter of conjecture whether 
or not it possessed the perfection of actual existence. The 
greatest conceivable being, however, is the sum of all perfections. 
There can be no doubt, therefore, that it would also contain the 
perfection of actual existence. 
Thus, it seems possible for Anselm to reply to Gaunilo's 
argument, although the reply retains much of the oddity of the 
Ontological Argument itself. The problem seems to be Anselm's 
assumption that actual existence is a perfection like any other 
perfection that a thing either has or lacks. Modern criticism of 
the argument has amounted to a denial of this assumption. The most 
famous of these is Kant's claim that existence is not a real 
predicate. 
"'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that 
is, it is not a concept of something which could be 
added to the concept of a thing, or of certain 
determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically 
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it is merely the copula of a judgment. 	 The 
proposition, 'God is omnipotent', contains two 
concepts, each of which has its object - God and 
omnipotence. The small word 'is' adds no new 
predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in 
its relation to the subject. If, now, we take the 
subject (God) with all its predicates (among which is 
omnipotence), and say 'God is', or 'There is a God', we 
attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only 
posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, 
and indeed posit it as being an object that stands in 
relation to my concept."' 
The argument is somewhat technical and obscure, but the point 
that Kant is making is clear enough. If I make an assertion such 
as "God is omnipotent", I am predicating a certain characteristic 
or attribute of God: In doing so, I am adding to or enlarging my 
concept of God. If, however, I assert that God exists, the 
"exists" in the proposition "God exists" does not function in the 
sane way as does the word "omnipotent" in the proposition "God is 
omnipotent". I am not predicating any new characteristic of God, I 
am not adding to my concept of God by asserting that He exists. 
Rather, I am asserting that something real corresponds to my 
concept; that the concept is instantiated. Thus, although they 
may perform the sane gramnatical function, they do not perform the 
sane logical function. 
1 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman 
Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), p.504. 
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Kant, then draws out attention to a distinction which Anselm 
himself drew; the distinction between the conceptual and the real. 
But, in opposition to Anselm, he claims that one is never justified 
in making the transition from the former to the latter purely from 
an examination of the conceptual. One could only do this if the 
concept of existence could be contained analytically within another 
concept; if existence could be a defining characteristic of some 
object. But, it is not and cannot be a characteristic of any sort, 
let alone a defining characteristic. No existential claim, then, 
can be analytic. 
This argument is a strong one and has often been considered 
fatal to Anselm's argument. It is not altogether clear, however, 
that this is so. 
"...in the form in which it is usually proposed 
'existence is not a real predicate' means no more than 
that 'exists' is not a predicate of the sane kind as 
other predicates, 'round', 'red', 'six feet tall', &c., 
and that it cannot be 'contained' analytically in the 
notion of any subject in the sane way as, say, the 
notion of 'plane figure containing two right angles' is 
contained in the notion of 'triangle'. In this form of 
the principle it is clear that neither Anselm nor 
Descartes is touched by it, for both admit that it is 
only in one unique case that 'exists' ' can be 
analytically contained within the notion of a 
subject."' 
1. Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion, p.65. 
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Once again, then, it seems that Anselm would be able to 
resurrect his argument by an appeal to the uniqueness of the case 
in question. I am not sure, however, that Anselm is untouched by 
the Kantian critique. It is certainly true that most arguments for 
the claim that existence is not a real predicate reach this 
conclusion by pointing to logical differences between the way in 
which the word "exists" functions in proposition of the form "x 
exists" and the way in which other words which we would normally 
allow as real predicates, function in sentences of the sane or a 
similar grammatical form.' It is also true that to have shown this 
is not necessarily to have shown that there is no sense in which 
"exists" can function as a real predicate. However, the issue is 
surely not whether "exists" can be considered a real predicate, in 
any sense, but whether it can be considered a real predicate in any 
sense that is helpful to Anselm's argument. 
The natural way in which to interpret Anselm's underlying 
assumption, that existence is a perfection that the greatest 
possible being must have, is that our concept of such a being must 
contain the notion of existence. Now, if it is conceded that 
existence is not a predicate in the way that roundness, redness, 
or whatever, is and that it cannot be contained analytically within 
the notion of a subject in the sane way that "plane figure 
containing two right angles "can be in the notion of "triangle", 
what is required is an explanation of how it can be. What is 
required, in other words, is an explanation of how we are to 
1. See for example, G.E. Moore,"Is existence a predicate", in The  
Ontological Argument, ed. Plantinga. 
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understand the claim that it is greater to exist both in the mind 
and inLi-eality;than in the mind alone.' In order to see the oddity 
of this claim, let us retrace Anselm's argument in the light of 
what Kant has had to say. 
The argument, it will be remembered, began with a definition 
of God as something-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought. Having 
formulated this definition Anselm went on to assert that, since it 
is possible to understand this definition, it is also possible to 
formulate a coherent concept of God. God, to use Anselm's 
terminology, was said to exist in the mind. Now, whether or not we 
wish to accept Anselm's conclusion, it is clear that the argument 
in its first stage is intelligible. This, however, is not 
obviously the case with the second stage of the argument. 
Anselm begins the second stage of his argument by claiming 
that "...if it (something-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought) 
exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in 
reality also, which is greater." This sentence is somewhat 
puzzling, but it seems to me that it contains the following three 
propositions which are important steps in his argument: 
If 	 (1) our concept of God is of a being that is not real 
then (2) we can formulate a concept of God as a being that is 
real. 
but (3) our concept of God as real is of a being that is 
greater than our concept of God as not real. 
The transition from propositions (1) and (2) to proposition (3) is 
by means of the hidden premise that it is greater to exist both in 
1. Charlesworth does, indeed, go on to make this point. 
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the mind and inreality than in the mind alone. 
From proposition (3), Anselm concludes that our concept of God 
as not real is incoherent since God is, by definition, the greatest 
conceivable being and this particular concept is not of such 
being. It cannot, therefore, be a concept of God. The importance 
of the Kantian critique, however, is to show that whilst this line 
of reasoning may be employed to show what other attributes God must 
have, it cannot be employed to show that He has the attribute of 
existence. 2 Furthermore, Kant gives us a reason why it cannot be 
used to do this. 
Let us allow, for the sake of argument, that the definition of 
"God" which Anselm supplies us with is both accurate and coherent. 
Suppose, then, that we wished to determine whether or not God was 
omnipotent. We could, it seems to me, use the argument outlined 
above to show that this was the case. We could do this by simply 
substitutitng the words "is omnipotent" and "is not omnipotent" for 
the words "is real" and "is not real" in propositions (1), (2) and 
(3). We would then have an argument something like the following. 
If (4) our concept of God is of a being that is not omnipotent 
then (5) we can formulate a concept of God as a being that is 
omnipotent 
but (6) our concept of God as omnipotent is of a being that is 
greater than our concept of God as not omnipotent. 
The transition from propositions (4) and (5) to proposition 
(6) assumes, of course, that a being which is omnipotent is 
1. This, of course, is to allow more than Kant would have 
allowed;. e.1 that existence is an attribute. 
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greater than a being that is not omnipotent. This assumption, 
however, seems to be a fair one. We can conclude, then, that since 
our concept of God is of the greatest conceivable being, our 
concept of God as not omnipotent is an incoherent one. From this 
we can go on to conclude the our concept of God must be of a being 
that is omnipotent. But, there seems to be an important difference 
between this argument and Anselm's. To bring out this difference, 
compare propositions (3) and (6). Proposition (6) is perfectly 
intelligible. Our concept of God as omnipotent is certainly of a 
different and, what is more, greater being than our concept of God 
as not omnipotent. What about proposition (3)? Is our concept of 
God as real of a different, let alone greater, being than our 
concept of God as not real? Surely not. Surely our concept, in 
both cases, is of the same being. But, if this is the case, then 
it is difficult to see how Anselm can make the transition from 
propositions (1) and (2) to the claim that the concept of God as 
not existing is an incoherent one. Furthermore, unless this 
transition can be made, the argument fails. 
NT 
The Proslogion II argument, thus, fails not because it can be 
demonstrated that there is no sense in which existence can be a 
real predicate, but because it is difficult to see that it can be 
in a sense that will help Anselm. But, what about the Proslogion  
III argument as developed by Malcolm and Hartshorne? I will now 
turn to a consideration of this question. In doing so, however, I 
will limit my discussion to Malcom's formulation of the argument 
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since my basic criticism of this, I believe, is also applicable to 
Hartshorne. 
Malcolm finds evidence for his new version of the Ontological 
Argument in the following passage from chapter 3 of the Froslogion. 
"And certainly this being so truly exists that it 
cannot be even thought not to exist. For something can 
be thought to exist that cannot be thought not to 
exist, and this is greater than that which can be 
thought not to exist. Hence, if that-than-which-a-
greater-cannot-be-thought can be thought not to exist, 
then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is not 
the sane as that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought 
which is absurd. Something-than-which-a-greater-
cannot-be-thought exists so truly then, that it cannot 
be even thought not to exist. 
And You, Lord our God, are this being."' 
He then goes on to give his interpretation of this passage and 
the argument he believes it to embody. 
"Previously I rejected existence as a perfection. 
Anselm is maintaining in the remarks last quoted, not 
that existence is a perfection, but that the logical 
impossibility of non-existence is a perfection. In 
other words, necessary existence is a perfection. His 
first ontological proof uses the principle that a thing 
is greater if it exists that if it does not exist. His 
second proof employs the different principle that a 
1. Anselm, Proslogion, 3. 
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thing is greater if it necessarily exists than if it 
does not necessarily exist."' 
The Proslogion II argument, in other words, rests upon the 
assumption that existence is a predicate and Malcolm believes that 
this criticism is fatal to it. The second argument, he claims, is 
based upon a different assumption, that necessary existence is a 
perfection. This-assumptiOn, he holds, is independent of the first 
and, as such, not subject to the same criticism. The crucial 
premise in this new argument, then, is that "a thing is greater if 
it necessarily exists than if it does not necessarily exists". 
Having made this point, he then goes on to make the following 
statement. 
"What Anselm has proved is that the notion of 
contingent existence or of contingent non existence 
cannot have any application to God. His existence must 
either be logically .necessary or logically impossible. 
The only intelligible way of rejecting Anselm's claim 
that God's existence is necessary is to maintain that 
the concept of God, as a being greater than which 
cannot be conceived, is self-contradictory or 
nonsensical. 112 
The crucial feature of Malcolm's argument, then, is the notion 
of necessary; as opposed to contingent, existence. Now, it is 
certainly true that the concept of God employed by many if not most 
1. Norman Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Arguments", in The,_ 
Ontological Argument, ed. Plantinga. 
2. Ibid., p145. 
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religious thinkers is that of a necessary being, but what exactly 
is meant by this term? As Hudson points out, there are at least 
two important ways in which it could be understood.' The first is 
that of a logically necessary being, the second of a factually or 
ontologically necessary being. A logically necessary being is one 
whose existence it is impossible to deny without contradiction. 
If, then, God is said to be a logically necessary being, the denial 
of the proposition "God exists" would be of self-contradictory. A 
factually or ontologically necessary being is one whose existence 
is not dependent upon any being other than itself. To talk of God 
as a necessary being in this sense is to talk of God as a being 
whose existence is totally independent of the existence of any 
other being. 
Now, in which of these two ways did Anselm employ the term? 
There is some dispute concerning the correct answer to this 
question. Malcolm clearly believes that Anselm's concept of God 
was that of a logically necessary being; or, at least this is what 
Is implied by his identification of the terms "necessary existence" 
and "logical impossibility of non-existence". Hick, however, has 
argued forcefully that Anselm conceived of God as a factually 
necessary being. 2 Quite irrespective of which answer is the 
correct one, however, is the important question of whether or not 
the claim that necessary existence in either sense of the word is a 
1. W. Donald Hudson, A Philosophical Approach to Religion  
(London: Macmillan, 1974), p.32. 
2. John Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God, (London: 
Macmillan, 1970), p.86. 
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characteristic that God, as the greatest conceivable being, must 
have can salvage the Ontological Argument. It is my belief that it 
cannot. 
Let us begin by examining the claim that God is a logically 
necessary being. This, as we saw, amounts to a claim that the 
proposition "God exists" is necessarily true. But, how can it be 
unless existence is a predicate which can be contained analytically 
within the notion of a subject? Malcolm, as we have seen, agreed 
that existence was not a real predicate, but it is difficult to see 
how the notion of logically necessary existence can make any sense 
unless we accept that it is. It is difficult to 'see, in other 
words, how Malcolm's argument differs from the first except in the 
matter of wording.' 
What about factually or ontologically necessary existence? If 
God's existence were seen to be necessary in this way, then He 
would be conceived as existing in a totally independent fashion. 
That is, His existence would not be dependent upon that of any 
other creature. Now, it is my belief that existence can be 
meaningfully predicated of God in this sense, but we cannot 
conclude from this that God actually exists. All that we are 
entitled to conclude is that, if God exists, His existence is such 
that it is independent of the existence of any other being. 
1. Malcolm does, of course, present arguments to show that they F _   	_ 	   
are distinct. Due to considerations of space I have not been able 
I 
however, see Penelhum,Religion and Rationality, p.365 - 375. 
_ 	 . to include these. 	 For an excellent examination of them, 
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Ve can conclude, then, that the Proslogion III argument is not 
successful as a sound Ontological Argument. 
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C H APT E R F O U R 
THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMEWT 
The Cosmological Argument, for the existence of God attempts 
to establish that God exists a posteriori. Thus, it differs from 
the Ontological Argument which was a purely a priori attempt to 
demonstrate the existence of God. The Ontological Argument, as we 
have seen, argued from what was taken to be the ordinary believer's 
concept of God to an affirmation of His existence, without any 
reference to human experience. The Cosmological Argument, however, 
takes as its initial premise some very general fact or set of facts 
about the world which, it is argued, are derived from experience. 
The existence of God is said to follow rationally from these facts. 
Cosmological Arguments are amongst the oldest of all theistic 
arguments.' 	 Early versions are to be found in the works of the 
great Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle. 	 It was also a 
popular form of argument amongst medieval Arabic and Jewish 
philosophers. The most famous versions of the Cosmological 
Argument in the western world, however, are those of St. Thomas 
Aquinas. It is to his Verions of the argument, accordingly, that I 
will confine my attention. 
1. For an excellent historical treatment of the Cosmological 
Argument see Wiliam Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument From 
Plato to Leibniz (London: Macmillan, 1980). 
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In the Sunna Theologian Aquinas offers five ways in which he 
believes that the existence of God may be demonstrated. These are 
the arguments from motion, causality, contingency, degrees of 
perfection, and design. Each of these five ways is in some sense a 
Cosmological Argument, although the first three are generally 
considered to be more typical of the argument as it is known today. 
For this reason I will confine my discussion to them. 
The first of Aquinas' five ways, and the one which he thought 
to be the most obvious, is the proof ex matu: from motion or 
change. It proceeds as follows: 
"The first and most obvious way is based on 
change. Some things in the world are certainly in 
process of change: this we plainly see. Now anything 
in process of change is being changed by something 
else. ... Moreover, this something else, if in 
process of change, is itself being changed by yet 
another thing: and this last by another. Now we must 
stop somewhere... . Hence one is bound to arrive at 
some first cause of change not itself being changed by 
anything, and this is what everybody understands by 
God." , 
1. Aquinas, EunmaLlhea nthgisa, la,2,3. 
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The argument, then, begins from the simple everyday 
observation that change occurs. From this initial premise, Aquinas 
proceeds to argue in the following manner: If change occurs, then 
there must be a cause of its occurrence and this cause must 
be external to the object undergoing change. Now, this cause of 
change must itself be an object which is either undergoing change 
or not undergoing change. If it is not undergoing change, then we 
have arrived at a first cause of change. If it is undergoing 
change, then, in turn, there must be an external cause of this 
change of which the sane question may be asked. Thus, we are faced 
with two alternatives. Either we arrive at some first, uncaused 
cause of change, or we are forced to posit an infinite series of 
objects causing change and being caused to change by another. But, 
Aquinas argues, an infinite series of this sort is impossible. We 
are, then, forced to arrive at a first, uncaused cause of change. 
This, Aquinas tells us, "everybody understands by God". 
The argument, then, in its most basic form, consists of the 
following propositions: 
(1) Change occurs. 
(2) Whenever change occurs there must be a cause of that 
change external to the object undergoing change. 
(3) An infinite series of objects causing change and being 
caused to change is impossible. 
(4) Therefore, we must arrive at a first, uncaused cause of 
change. 
The sane argument, in a somewhat extended form, is to be found 
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in the Summa Contra Gentiles.' 	 Here Aquinas attributes the 
argument to Aristotle. Here also he acknowledges that the crucial 
premises are propositions (2) and (3). Proposition (1) he saw as 
an indisputable truth, guaranteed by the senses. One need simply 
observe the world around \ us, Aquinas felt, to see that some 
- - things are in the process of changing from one state to another. 
The first premise, then, is felt to have its basis in experience. 
Propositions (2) and (3), however, do not. Nor is their truth seen 
to be self-evident. Aquinas felt it necessary to provide 
additional arguments to support the truth of these propositions. 
Before examining these, however, it will be useful to elucidate 
precisely what Aquinas understood by the word "change". 




"change". 	 Thus, the proof ex motu is refered to 
the argument from motion and sometimes as the argument 
In the past, the most common translation o motust 
was in favour of the term. This translation, however, is somewhat 
misleading. 	 "Motion" is generally used, today, to refer 
specifically to local motion; 	 that is, to change in spatial 
location. This, however, is only part of what Aquinas wished to 
convey by the term motus . He also used it to refer to any 
qualitative or quantitative change in an object. A hand moving a 
poker was an example of motus for Aquinas, but so was a poker 
getting hot in a fire. Equally, physical growth and decay were 
examples of motus. For this reason, modern commentators have 
1. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 13. 
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tended to translate 'motus' as "change". 	 It is the translation 
which I will adhere to in my treatment of the argument. 
Proposition (1), then, should be interpreted as a claim that 
some physical objects are subject to change in a qualitative sense, 
in a quantitive sense and with regards to spatial location. This 
Aquinas considered to be an empirical fact and he is surely 
correct. 
Having said this, we may turn to consider propositions (2) and 
(3). I will begin with a consideration of his argument in favour 
of proposition (2). It proceeds as follows: 
"Now anything in process of change is being 
changed by something else. This is so because it is 
characteristic of things in process of change that they 
do not yet have the perfection towards which they move, 
though able to have it; whereas it is characteristic 
of something causing change to have that perfection 
already. For to cause change is to bring into being 
what was previously only able to be, and this can only 
be done by something that already is: thus fire, which , 
is actually hot, causes wood, which is able to be hot, 
to becone actually hot, and in this way causes change 
in the wood. Now the sane thing cannot at the sane 
time be both actually x and potentially x, though it 
can be actually x and potentially y: the actually hot 
cannot at the same time be potentially hot, though it 
can be potentially cold. Consequently, a thing in 
process of change cannot itself cause that same change; 
it cannot change itself. Of necessity therefore 
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anything in process of change is being changed by 
something else."' 
This argument is based upon an \Aristotelian understanding of _ - 
change as a movement from potentiality to act. Whatever is in 
process of change towards some state, y, is said to be potentially 
in that state, but actually in some other state, x. When the 
process of change is complete it will not longer be potentially in 
y, it will now be actually in y. But, since it is now actually in 
y, it is no longer actually in x. At the best, it is now only 
potentially in x. Thus, a poker when placed in a fire is said to 
be actually cold but potentially hot. When it has been in the fire 
for some tine, it will be actually hot and, at the best, only 
potentially cold. Now, Aquinas argues, nothing which is 
potentially y can become actually y unless there is something 
already in y causing it to do so. Our poker cannot become hot 
unless caused to do so by something already hot, for example, a 
fire. Furthermore, nothing can be both potentially and actually y 
at the same time. Our poker cannot be both hot and cold at the 
sane time. It follows, therefore, that nothing can cause itself to 
change, but must be caused to do so by something external to 
itself. Thus, we arrive at the general principle that anything in 
process of change is changed by another. 
7- 
This argument, shed of its Aristotelian terminology, may be - 	 _ 
put as follows: 
(i) Whenever change occurs, an object moves from some state, 
x, to another state, y. 
1. Aquinas, SaluneLiketangiati, 1a,2,3. 
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(ii) No object can move from state, x, to state, y, unless 
caused to do so by something already in state, y. 
(iii) No object can be both in state, x, and in state, y, at 
the same time. 
(2) Therefore, whenever change occurs, there must be cause of 
that change external to the object undergoing change. 
The point of this argument is to establish the general 
principle that whenever we observe some object undergoing change 
there is an external cause of that change, by excluding the 
possibility that an object can cause change in itself. The 
argument, however, fails. The crucial premise is, quite clearly, 
proposition (ii). But, this proposition is problematic. To begin 
with, it would appear to admit to obvious counter-examples. It may 
well be the case that a poker can only become hot if caused to do 
so by something already hot, or wet if caused to do so by something 
already wet. But, it is not very difficult to think of examples of 
objects changing from one state to another that do not appear to be 
caused to do so by something already in that state. Is a stick 
moved from one position to another always caused to do so by 
something already in that position? Is a flower that wilts caused 
to do so by something which has already wilted? It is difficult to 
see how. 
A more telling objection to this proposition, however, is that 
It is difficult to see how Aquinas can hold it and remain 
consistent. As Rowe points out, Aquinas certainly believed that 
God could directly cause a cold object to become hot, but he would 
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certainly not hold that God is in a state of being hot.' 
Perhaps, however, this criticism is unfair. 	 Craig, 	 for 
example, argues that it rests upon a misunderstanding of Aquinas' 
argument. 
"Thomas does not want to prove that a cause must 
actually possess the very quality it is causing in its 
effect; this would be utterly counter-productive, 
since then the unmoved first mover would have to 
actually possess all the qualities that it causes, 
which is absurd. What he wants to prove is that 
anything in change is being actualised by a being 
already actual. ... . The real thrust of the proof is 
that the actualising of a potential can only be done by 
some actual thing."2 
The misunderstanding, however, appears to rest with Craig. It 
is certainly true that Aquinas did not wish to prate that a cause 
must possess the very quality it is causing in its effect, but 
neither did he wish to prove that anything in process of change is 
being actualised by a being already actual. What he wished to 
prove was that anything in process of change is being caused to 
change by something external to itself. The claim that a cause 
must possess the very quality it is causing in its effect appears 
to be an essential part of his argument for this conclusion. 
1.Willam 1. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton: 
Princetion University Press, 1975), p.15. 
2.Craig,The Cosmological Argument From Plato to Leibniz, p.172. 
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Perhaps, however, he can reach this conclusion without proposition 
(ii) by formulating an argument around the following proposition: 
(ha) Anything in change is being actualised by a being already 
actual. 
The problem with this suggestion, however, is that it is by no 
means clear how proposition (ha) is to be understood. The phrase, 
"is being actualised", it would seem, refers to the object 
undergoing change. But it is not clear what meaning we are to give 
to it. If it means that the object undergoing change moves from a 
state of being potentially, y, to a state of being actually, y, 
then proposition (ha) appears to be a claim that anything in 
change moves from a state of being potentially y to a state of 
being actually y and is caused to do so by something actually in y. 
But this, of course is exactly what is being asserted by 
proposition (ii) and is subject to the sane difficulties. If, on 
the other hand, it means that anything undergoing change is not an 
actual but only a potential being and must, therefore, be 
actualised by an actual being, it would seem to commit Aquinas to 
an understanding of change that is totally foreign to him and 
patently absurd. Surely, if something is undergoing change it must 
be an actual being or there would be nothing to undergo change. 
But, if we allow that the object undergoing change must be an 
actual being and stipulate only that the cause of change must be an 
actual being without any reference to the qualities which that 
being possesses, then how can we exclude the possibility of an 
object causing change in itself? The answer, surely, is that we 
could not. But, is this not precisely what Aquinas is attempting 
to do? 
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This brings our discussion to another problem facing 
proposition (ii). If some being, A, is undergoing change, then 
there are three possibilities. Firstly, A is itself the cause of 
this change, Secondly, the cause of this change is some other 
object, B. Thirdly, there is no cause of the change in A. 
Proposition (ii), taken in itself, allows for the first two 
possibilities, but not for the third. This, as Rowe points out, 
reveals an important assumption underlying Aquinas' argument.' 
This is the assumption that the occurence of change is never a 
brute fact, that there is always a cause of change. Row, it may 
well be that this assumption is warranted, but Aquinas gives us no 
reason to believe that it is. Furthermore, since there does not 
appear to be any absurdity in the supposition that change may occur 
without any cause, some reason for rejecting this possibility is 
necessary if the argument is to be considered successful. 
Thus, it would seem, Aquinas does not successfully establish 
the truth of proposition (2). Nevertheless, an unsuccessful 
argument does not necessarily mean a false conclusion and there is 
some intuitive plausibility in the claim that whatever changes is 
caused to change by something external to itself. This being the 
case, we could, perhaps, allow proposition (2) and proceed to a 
consideration of Aquinas' argument for proposition (3). 
Proposition (3) involves the claim that an infinite series of 
things causing change and being caused to change is impossible. 
Aquinas' argument for this proposition proceeds as follows: 
1. Rowe, The_Gosmologicalitrument, p.16 - 17. 
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"Now we must stop somewhere, otherwise there will 
be no first cause of the change, and as a result, no 
subsequent cause. For it is only when acted upon by 
the first causes that the intermediate causes will 
produce the change: if the hand does not move the 
stick, the stick will not move anything else."' 
This argument is weak, to say the least. Aquinas begins by 
arguing that the notion of an infinite series of objects causing 
change and being caused to change excludes the possibility of a 
first cause of change. Now this, quite clearly, is true. In fact, 
the very definition of an infinite series of causes implies the 
impossibility of a first cause. But, Aquinas goes on to argue that 
if we exclude the possibility of a first cause of change, we must 
also exclude the possibility of any subsequent causes of change. 
In other words, unless there is a first cause of change, there will 
be no causes of change at all and, therefore, no change. But, this 
argument is quite clearly fallacious. Aquinas appears to be 
confusing an infinite series of causes with one that is very long, 
but finite. 2 In a finite series of causes, no matter how long, it 
is certainly true that there will be no series of causes unless 
there is a first cause. But, an infinite series of causes is 
precisely one in which causes occur without there being a first 
cause. Now, it may well be the case there is some inherent 
contradiction in the notion of an infinite series of causes, but 
1. Aquinas, EunmeLmiejacgira., la,2,3. 
2. Paul Edwards, "The Cosmological Argument ", in Philosophy of 
Religion, ed., Rowe and Vainwright, p.141. 
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Aquinas' argument gives us no reason to believe that this is the 
case. 
At this point, however, commentators have pointed to a certain 
ambivalence in Aquinas' position. The problem concerns the type of 
series that he wishes to exclude. The natural way to read the 
argument is to see it as refering to an infinite series stretching 
backward in tine. The problem with this interpretation, however, 
is that Aquinas, elsewhere, admits that there is no inherent 
contradiction in the idea of such a series.' His view, which 
caused quite a stir amongst many of his contemporaries, was that 
although we must hold as an article of faith that the world had a 
beginning in time, this was not open to demonstration. But, if 
this is the case, how can one, by rational means, exclude the 
possibility of an infinite series of causes stretching backward in 
tine? Aquinas states that one cannot. But, is this not 
inconsistent with his rejection of infinite causal series in this 
argument? It would appear that it is not. Aquinas distinguishes 
between two types of causal series. The first type, a causal 
series ordered per accidens, can, he accepts, be conceived without 
absurdity to stretch infinitely backwards in tine. The second 
type, a series of causes ordered per se, he states quite 
explicitly, cannot. 2 
Now, of course, it does not matter whether Aquinas is refering 
to an infinite series of causes ordered per accidens or an infinite 
series of causes ordered per se, the argument outlined above would 
1. Aquinas, sunma_Thesangica., la,2,3. 
2. Ibid. 
not successfully rule out the possibility of either. Nevertheless, 
some discussion of this distinction is important. It may well be 
that when we cone to understand it, we will recognise the validity 
of the point which Aquinas is trying to make. I will delay this 
discussion, however, since the sane issue arises with respect to 
Aquinas' second way, which we will turn to now. 
II 
The second of Aquinas' five ways is the proof ex causalitate; 
from causality. It proceeds as follows: 
"The second way is based on the nature of 
causation. In the observable world causes are found to 
be ordered in series; we never observe, nor ever 
could, something causing itself, for this would mean it 
preceeded itself, and this is not possible. Such a 
series must however stop somewhere ... One is 
therefore forced to suppose some first cause, to which 
everyone gives the name 'God'".' 
This argument, then, begins not with the doctrine of universal 
causality, as is often asserted, but with the claim that we can 
observe the existence of causal series within the world. This 
premise unless we adhere to a strictly Humean analysis of 
causality, can at least have pretensions to being an empirical 
fact. The doctrine of universal causality, quite clearly, cannot. 
From this basic premise, Aquinas proceeds to argue that no causal 
1. Aquinas, aumm,a_Theologica, la,2,3. 
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series can be infinite and that, therefore, there must be some 
first cause, "to which everybody gives the name 'God". In its 
essence, then, the argument proceeds as follows: 
(1) Causal series exist in the world. 
(2) No causal series can be infinite. • 
(3) Therefore, there must be a first cause. 
It is quite evident, then, that the basic structure of the 
first two ways is the sane. In both, Aquinas begins by 
establishing the existence of a causal series. He then proceeds to 
deny the possibility Of this causal series being an infinite one. 
From this he concludes that there must be some first cause. But, 
despite this similarity of structure, there are a number of 
differences which we need to be aware of. 
Firstly, the notion of casuality operating in the second way 
is somewhat wider than that operating in the first. The first way 
considers only causes of change. The second way considers not only 
causes of change, but also causes of an object coming in-to or 
going out of existence. Moreover, the first way considers the 
cause of change from the point of view of the effect, the body 
acted upon, whereas the second way considers it from the point of 
view of the cause or agent. 2 
Secondly, the first way took its point of departure from the 
fact that change occurs and arrived at the existence of a causal 
series by arguing that nothing can cause change in itself. His 
1. Anthony Kenny, ,The Five Ways , (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1969), p.35-6. 
2. Ibid. 
4' ) 
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argument for this, as we saw, involved the assumption that the 
occurrence of change can never be a brute fact. The second way, 
however, requires no such assumption.' The point of departure of 
this proof is the existence of a causal series which is taken to be 
an empirical fact. He then argues that if a causal series exists, 
it cannot be infinite but must terminate in some first cause. It 
is true that, in the course of his exposition of the second way, 
Aquinas makes an assertion that nothing can cause itself, by which 
he presumably means both that nothing can cause change in itself 
and that nothing can bring itself into existence. This assertion, 
however, appears to be superfluous to his overall argument except 
to show that the causal series cannot end in a being which is the 
cause of its own existence. The first cause which his argument 
attempts to establish, then, whatever else it may be, is not a 
self-caused being. 
Having made these points, we may now turn to the argument 
itself. 
Proposition (1), as we have seen, asserts that causal series 
	 _ 	 _ 	 . 	 ---- --- exist in the world and-this is-taken to be an empirical fact. We 
- --------- 
cannot, however, allow it as readily as we did the first premise of 
the proof ex motu. The problem is that we now know that Aquinas 
was refering to the existence of a causal series ordered per se and 
not a causal series ordered per accidens. It is now tine, then, to 
turn our attention to this distinction. Until we understand what 
it amounts to, we cannot make any judgment concerning the existence 
of a causal series ordered per se. 
1. Rowe, The Cosmological 	p.21 
4A, 
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Aquinas makes reference to the distinction in the following 
passage taken from the Sum= Theologica: 
"An infinite 	 series of efficient 	 causes 
essentially subordinate to one another is impossible, 
that is causes that are per se required for the effect, 
as when a stone is moved by a stick, a stick by a hand, 
and so forth: 	 such a series cannot be prolonged 
indefinitely. 	 All the sane an infinite series of 
efficient causes incidently subordinate to one another 
is not counted impossible, as when they are all ranged  
under a causal heading and how many there are is quite 
incidental. For example, when a smith picks up many 
hammers because one after another has been broken in 
his hand, it is accidental to one particular hammer 
that it is employed after another particular hammer. 
So is the fact that another has procreated him to the 
procreating act of a particular man, for he does this 
as a man, and not as the son of a father. For all men 
in begetting hold the sane rank in the order of 
efficient causes, namely that of being a particular 
parent. Hence it is not out of the question for a man 
begotten by a man to be begotten by a man and so on 
endlessly. This would not be the case were this 
begetting to depend on another man or on material 
elements and solar energy and so on; such a series 
cannot be interminable."' 
1. Aquinas, sunna_Theralogica, la,46,2. 
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In this passage, Aquinas does not elucidate the distinction to 
any great degree, although he does give us examples of both type of 
causal series. Fortunately, however, the distinction was a common 
one amongst medieval philosophers. By reference to the work of 
others and in particular Duns Scotus, modern scholars have been 
able to arrive at some understanding of the distinction that 
Aquinas was drawing. It is explained in the following manner by 
Patterson Brown: 
...each member of an essential series (except of 
course the first and the last if there be such) is 
causally dependent upon its predecessor for its causal 
efficacy regarding its successor. • • • In an 
accidental series, however, each member is not , 
dependent upon its predecessor for its own causal 
efficacy - though it may be dependent in some other 
regard."' 
Consider Aquinas' first example of a causal series ordered per 
se, that of a hand moving a stick which in turn moves a stone. 
Here, the movement in the stone is being caused by the movement in 
the stick which, in turn, is being caused by the movement in the 
hand. This causal series is an essentially ordered series because 
the movement of the stick is causally dependent upon the movement 
of the hand for its causal efficacy upon the stone. Equally, if 
the movement of the stone causes movement in another object, for 
1. Patterson Brown, "Infinite Causal Regression", in Aquinas: A 
Collection of Critical Essays ed. Anthony Kenny (London: 
Macmillan, 1969), p.227. 
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example another stone, then the first stone will be causally 
dependent upon the movement of the stick for its causal efficacy 
with regards to the second stone. 
Now, let us contrast this example with the example which 
Aquinas gives us of causal series ordered per accidens; that of 
human generation. Suppose that one man, A, begat another, B, who 
in turn begat a third, C. Here, A is the cause of B coming into 
existence and B is the cause of C coming into existence. There is 
a sense, then in which each is a member of a causal series, since B 
would not have begat C unless A had begat him or he had cone into 
existence in. some other way. However, the causal series which 
Aquinas asks us to consider here is clearly different from the one 
which we considered in the previous example. In the previous 
example, each member was causally dependent upon its predecessor 
for its causal efficacy regarding its successor. Had the hand not 
been acting causally upon the stick, the stick would not have been 
acting causally upon the stone. Here, however, this is not the 
case. In this series, whilst it is true that A causes B to come 
into existence and B causes C to come into existence, it is not 
true that what causes B to cause C to cone into existence is A 
causing B to cone into existence.' B, then, is not causally 
dependent upon A for his causal efficacy with regards to C. 
The question which now confronts us is whether or not 
proposition (1) is true; whether or not causal series ordered per 
se exist. The answer, quite clearly, is that they do. Aquinas, 
after all, gives us an example of such a series; that is, the hand 
1. Rowe,The_Coszalogical_Azgunent p.25. 
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moving the stick, moving the stone. 	 Furthermore, it is not 
difficult to think of other examples. A stew being heated by a pot 
being heated •by a fire is such an example.'A horse pushing a 
harness, pushing a cart is yet another. The question now arises as 
to whether or not such a series can be infinite. Aquinas, as we 
have seen, felt that it could not. 
The first point which needs to be made is that a series of 
causes ordered per se could not possibly stretch backwards 
infinitely in tine. From the account which Aquinas gives us of 
this type of series, it would appear that each member of such a 
series is acted upon causally by its predecessor and acts causally 
upon its successor at precisely the sane time. In other words, it 
seems to be a necessary feature of any causal series ordered per se 
that the causal activity of all its members occurs simultaneously. 
In the example which Aquinas makes so much of, the movement of the 
hand, the stick and the stone is simultaneous. If, then, we allow 
the possibility of an infinite causal series of the type which - 	, 
Aquinas isrreferringito, we are allowing the possibility of an 
infinite series of causes acting upon one another simultaneously. 
This fact, however, on its own, should not trouble us too much. As 
difficult as it may be to attempt to trace such a,series, it is 
certainly not obvious that the concept of such a series is an 
absurd one. Aquinas, however, thinks differently. In his 
exposition of proof ex causalitate he offers the following argument 
against the idea Of an infinite series of causes: 
1. Brown, "Infinite Causal Regression", p.228. 
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"Such a series of causes must however stop 
somewhere; for in it an earlier member causes an 
intermediate and the intermediate a last (whether the 
intermediate be one or many). Now if you eliminate a 
cause you also eliminate its effects, so that you 
cannot have a last cause, nor an intermediate one, 
unless you have a first. Given therefore no stop in 
the series of causes, and hence no first cause, there 
would be no intermediate causes either, and no last 
effect, and this would be an open mistake."' 
The problem with this argument, however, is that it seems to 
be essentially the same as the argument against infinite causal 
regression which Aquinas gave us in the proof ex motu. This being 
the case, it would be open to the same sorts of objection. It is 
certainly true that if you eliminate any one member of a causal 
series, you will thereby eliminate all the subsequent members. 
This is true of both a finite and an infinite series. But, Aquinas 
goes on to argue that if you dispense with the concept of a first 
cause, you will thereby eliminate all the members of the series. 
In other words, without a first cause, there will be no causal 
activity at all. But, this is only true if one is!referringto a 
finite series of causes. 	 An infinite series of causes is, 
precisely, one which has no first member: 	 It makes no sense to 
talk of eliminating the first member of an infinite series of 
causes. Aquinas' argument, then, merely begs the question. 
Thus, Aquinas' argument once again falters upon the question 
I. Aquinas, sunmeLlhesaggica., la,2,3. 
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of infinite causal regression. But, it seems to me that, even if 
we allow that no causal series ordered per se can be infinite and 
that there must be a first member of any series of this type, there 
is absolutely no compulsion to identify this first cause as a God 
of any sort, let alone as the God of the Judea-Christian 
Monotheistic tradition. 
Let us take, for example, the paradigm example of a causal 
series ordered per se which Aquinas provides us with; that of the 
hand moving the stick, moving the stone. If we are told that this 
series is a finite one and must, therefore, have a first member, why ; ; 
must we go beyond the person whose hand moves the stick to find 
this first member?' The sane consideration applies to the other 
examples of causal series ordered per se which were suggested 
above. When we look for a first cause in the series of the stew 
being heated by the pot being heated by the fire, or the horse 
pushing the harness pushing the cart, why must we go beyond either 
the fire or the horse respectively? There is no obvious reason why 
we must. Furthermore, even if such a reason exists, we would still 
require a reason to believe that this first cause must be a 
supernatural being before we could even begin to conclude, with 
Aquinas, that it is that "to which everyone gives the name 'God'". 
The causal series which we have considered so far, however, 
are those which are referred to both in the first and in the second 
way; that is, causal series involving change. The second way, as 
pointed out previously, also refers to causal series involving the 
coming into and going out of existence of things. Perhaps here we 
1. Kenny, The Five Ways, p.45. 
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might discover a causal series which terminates in a supernatural 
being. The problem with this suggestion, however, is that it is by 
no means clear that a causal series of this type, which will do the 
Job for Aquinas, even exists. 
An example of a causal series involving the coming into 
existence of a thing is that of a person begeting another who in 
turn begets another. This series, however, is a causal series 
ordered per accidens and, therefore, not the type of series to 
which Aquinas was addressing himself. But, Aquinas does give us an 
example of a causal series involving the generation of a man which 
he believes is ordered per se. An infinite series of causes would - 
be impossible were the begetting of a man to depend on another man 	 _ 	 J 
or on material elements and solar energy and so on."' 
The problem here, however, is to understand what it is that he 
is saying. Copleston has interpreted this passage in the 
following way: 
"Wlat he is thinking of can be illustrated in 
this way. A son is dependent on his father, in the 
sense that he would not have existed except for the 
causal activity of his father. But when the son acts 
for himself, he is not dependent here and now on his 
father. 	 But he is dependent here and now on other 
factors. 	 Without the activity of the air, for 
instance, he could not himself act, and the life-
preserving activity of the air is itself dependent here 
1. Aquinas, SummaTheologica, a,2,3. 
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and now on other factors, and they in turn on other 
factors."' 
The point, presumably, is that the present existence of the 
son is not dependent upon the causal activity of the father, but is 
dependent upon the causal activity of the air, the sun, the 
material elements and what have you. These, in turn, it would 
seem, are dependent upon the causal activity of other factors 
culminating eventually in God. But, as Kenny points out, it is by 
no means certain that here we have an example of a causal series at 
al1. 2 What we seem to have is simply a series of necessary 
conditions and it is difficult to see why such a series, if it 
cannot be an endless one, must culminate in God. This being the 
case, it would seem that neither the proof ex matu nor the proof ex 
causalitate succeed in demonstrating the existence of God. We may 
now turn to the third of Aquinas' five ways. 
III 
The third of Aquinas' five ways is the proof ex contingentia 
mundi; from contingency. It proceeds as follows: 
- 
"The third way is based on what need not be and on 
what must be, and runs as follows. Some of the things 
we come across can be but need not be, for we find them 
springing up and dying away, thus sometimes in being 
1. F. C. Copleston, Aquinas (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1955), p.122. 
2. Kenny, The Five Ways, p.45. 
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and sometimes not. 	 Now everything cannot be like, 
this ... there has got be something that must be. Now 
a thing that must be, may or may not owe this necessity 
to something else. But just as we must stop somewhere 
in a series of causes, so also in the series of things 
which must be and owe this to other things. One is 
forced therefore to suppose something which must be, 
and owes this to no other thing itself; indeed it 
itself is the cause that other things must be."' 
The third way, then, proceeds from the observation that some 
things in the world can be, but need not be. Now, a thing which 
can be but need not be is, to use the more common terminology, a 
contingent being. The first premise of the argument, then, is that 
contingent beings exist and this, once again, is taken to be an 
empirical fact. Aquinas then goes on to argue that not everything 
can be a contingent being, that if contingent beings exist, so must 
at least one being which is not a contingent being. A being which 
is not a contingent being is a necessary being, one which simply 
must be. But, Aquinas tells us that a necessary being may or may 
not owe its necessity to something else. By this, he presumably 
means that a necessary being may or may not have the cause of its 
necessity external to itself. If a necessary being does have the 
cause of its necessity external to itself, the implication is that 
this cause must be another necessary being which, in turn, may or 
may not have the cause of its necessity external to itself. Now, 
the argument goes, an infinite series of necessary beings, each 
1. Aquinas, Eunm,Lihgialugica, la,2,3. 
- 102- 
having the cause of its necessity external to itself, is 
impossible. There must, therefore, exist a necessary being which 
does not have the cause of its necessity external to itself. The 
final step, that this is what everone understands by "God°, we are 
left to make for ourselves. 
The argument, then, consists of two stages. The first stage 
argues from the existence of contingent beings to the existence of 
at least one necessary being. But, Aquinas does not believe that 
he has established the existence of God when he has established 
that a necessary being exists as is sometimes asserted. Indeed, he 
quite explicity allows for the existence of not Just one but a 
plurality of necessary beings. His concept of God, then, is not 
Just that of a necessary being, but of a necessary being which does 
not have the cause of its necessity external to itself. It is this 
which distinguishes God from other things such as Angels, souls, 
prime matter and celestial bodies which he also considered to be 
necessary beings. These other things have the cause of their 
necessity external to themselves. Indeed, as he informs us at the 
very end of this proof, this cause is God. The second stage of the 
argument, then, argues from the existence of at least one necessary 
being to the existence of a necessary being which does not have the 
cause of its necessity external to itself. 
In its essence, then, Aquinas' argument from contingency 
consist of the following propositions: 
(1) Contingent beings exist. 
(2) Not everything can be a contingent being. 
(3) Therefore a necessary being must exist. 
(4) A necessary being may or may not have the cause of its 
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necessity external to itself. 
(5)An infinite series of necessary beings, each having the 
cause of its necessity external to itself, is impossible. 
(6)Therefore, a necessary being which does not have the 
cause of its necessity external to itself must exist. 
Quite clearly, then, the argument rests upon two very basic 
distinctions. 	 Firstly, the distinction between contingent and 
necessary beings. 	 Secondly, the distinction between necessary 
beings which which have the cause of their necessity external to 
themselves and that necessary being which does not. It is 
important to understand these two distinctions before we can begin 
to assess the argument itself. 
The first point that should be established is that by the term 
"necessary being" Aquinas was not referring to a being whose non-
existence is logically impossible. His concept of a necessary 
being is, indeed, that of a being which simply must be. But a 
number of modern commentators have argued convincingly that by this 
he did not mean a being whose existence it is self-contradictory to 
deny.' This is an important point, for it has been argued by Kant 
and others that the Cosmological Argument is fallacious, since it 
ultimately rests upon the Ontological Argument.2 Kant understood 
the Cosmological Argument as consisting of two stages. The first 
stage argued that if something exists, a necessary being must also 
1.See Patterson Brown, "St. Thomas' Doctrine of Necessary 
Being", in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. 
Kenny; and Kenny, The Five Ways. 
2.Kant, Critique of Pure Reasoa,ipp-. 5-P7_51-0 
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exist. The second stage argued that any necessary being must be an 
infinitely perfect being, an ens realissimum. The flaw, he felt, 
was in the second stage. His argument was, that to prove that a 
necessary being must be a perfect being amounts to proving that a 
perfect being must be a necessary being, which is just what the 
Ontological Argument was intended to do. Since, then, the 
Cosmological Argument presupposed the Ontological Argument, it 
was open to the sane sorts of criticism. 
More recently, J.J.C. Smart has argued that the problem is 
not, as Kant felt it was, in the second stage of the argument, but 
in the first.' The first stage of the argument, he tells us, 
purports to establish the existence of a necessary being, by which 
Smart argues is meant a logically necessary being. But, the 
concept of such a being is self-contradictory, he believes, for the 
following reason: 
"Now since 'necessary' is a word which applies 
• primarily to propositions, we shall have to interpret 
'God is a necessary being' as 'The proposition "God 
exists" is logically necessary'. But this is the 
principle of the ontological argument..."2 
Mow, whether or not these criticisms are pertinent to some 
version or other of the Cosmological Argument is not important for 
us to consider in this discussion. What is important, however, is 
1.J.J.C. 	 Smart, "The Existence of God", in New Essays in  
Philosophical Theology, eds. 	 Antony Flew and Alasdair 
MacIntyre (London:SCM,1955), p.38. 
2.Ibid. 	 • 
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to point out that neither Kant's nor Smart's comments are relevant 
to Aquinas' argument from contingency.' Aquinas, after all, 
allowed for the existence of a plurality of necessary beings. It 
is very doubtful, therefore, that he would have held that every 
necessary being must be an infinitely perfect being. As we saw, he 
believed that angels, souls, prime matter and celestial 
bodies were necessary beings, but he certainly would not have held 
that they were infinitely perfect. Moreover, he explicitly states 
that a necessary being may have its necessity caused by another 
being. This seems to rule out the possibility that by "necessary 
being" Aquinas meant "Being .whose existence is logically 
necessary". As Brown points out, "it would be naive to think that 
there could be an efficient cause for what is logically 
necessary".2 But, if the third of Aquinas' proofs is not referring 
to a being, the existence of which it is impossible to deny, what 
kind of being is it referring to? Brown explains the concept of 
necessity with which Aquinas is dealing in the following manner: 
"... Aquinas meant by the term "necessary", as 
applied to beings, that they be neither generable nor 
corruptible. 	 That is to say, a necessary being is 
defined as one which cannot cone into existence via 
conglomeration, Construction, or (re)formation, and 
which cannot pass out of existence via deterioration, 
destruction, or deformation." 




Thus, a necessary being, in contrast to a contingent being is 
one that is not subject to natural processes of generation or 
corruption. But, a necessary being is not necessarily an eternal 
or everlasting being. Although it may not be subject to natural 
processes. of generation or corruption, it may cone into existence 
through creation ex nihilo or pass out of existence by total 
annihilation.' Now, when Aquinas distinguishes between necessary 
beings which have the cause of their necessity external to 
themselves and that necessary being which does not, he is 
distinguishing between those necessary beings which have been 
created ex nihilo, such as the angels, souls, prime matter and 
celestial bodies, and that necessary being which created them, that 
is God. God, then, is seen as that necessary being which is 
eternal and everlasting and which is the cause of all other beings. 
The first premise of Aquinas' argument from contingency, then 
should be seen as asserting that some things' exist which are 
subject to natural processes of generation and corruption. Quite 
clearly, there are. The pen with which I am writing, the tree 
which I observe in the garden, the chair I am sitting on and what 
have you. But, Aquinas asserts that not everything can be like 
this. His argument for proposition (2) proceeds as follows: 
"Now everything cannot be like this, for a thing 
that need not be, once was not; and if everything need 
not be, once upon a time there was nothing. But if 
that were true there would be nothing even now, because 
something that does not exist can only be brought into 
1. 	 Ibid., p.165. 
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being by something already existing. 	 So that if 
nothing was in being nothing could be brought into 
being, and nothing would be in being now, which 
contradicts observation. Not everything therefore is 
the sort of thing that need not be; there has got to 
be something that must be." 
This argument takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum of the 
claim that everything is a contingent being. A contingent being, 
as we have seen, is one that is subject to natural processes of 
generation and corruption. From this, Aquinas appears to derive 
the general principle that whatever is a contingent being, at one 
time did not exist. But, he goes on to argue, if this is true and 
if everything is a contingent being, at one time nothing existed. 
And, if at one time nothing existed, nothing would exist now. 
Thus, since something obviously exists now, not everything can be a 
contingent being. 
The argument, then, takes the following form: 
(i) Whatever is a contingent being, at one time did not 
exist. 
(ii) If everything is a contingent being, then at one 
time nothing existed. 
(iii)If at one time nothing existed, then nothing would 
exist now. 
(iv) Something obviously exists now. 
(2) 	 Therefore, not everything can be a contingent being. 
This argument, however, is open to challenge at each of the 
1. Aquinas, Eunizi_Thealigara, la,2,3. 
- 108- 
first three steps. To begin with, the truth of (i) is by no means 
self-evident. From Aquinas' understanding of a contingent being as 
one which is subject to a natural processes of generation and 
corruption, it does not follow that every contingent being, at 
some tine, actually generated.' The idea of a contingent being 
which has always existed and which is kept in existence by natural 
processes does not appear to be an absurd one. But, even if we 
concede proposition (i) to Aquinas, we cannot concede proposition 
(ii). Even if we allow that every contingent being is such that at 
one time it did not exist, it certainly does not follow that, if 
everything is a contingent being, at one time nothing existed. 2 It 
is not difficult to conceive of an infinite number of contingent 
beings coming into and going out of existence over an infinite 
• period of tine, but in such a configuration that there is no period 
of time in which at least one contingent being exists. But, even 
if we concede both propositions (i) and (ii), ,there is no 
compulsion to accept the truth of proposition (iii). Indeed, as 
Rowe points out, it reveals an important assumption which underlies 
Aquinas' reasoning. 3 Aquinas' reason for holding (iii) is that 
"something that does not exist can only be brought into being by 
something already existing." In other words, he quite explicitly 
adopts the principle that whatever comes into existence is caused 
to do so by something already in existence. In doing so, he 
rejects the possibility that the coming into existence of a thing 
1. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument, p.42. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid, p.44. 
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night be simply a brute fact. Now, it may indeed be true that 
whatever cones into existence is caused to do so by something other 
than itself, but, once again, Aquinas gives us no reason for 
holding this proposition. It is an unquestioned assumption. 
Thus, Aquinas' argument for propositon (2), that not 
everything can be a contingent being is unsuccessful. This being 
the case, the first stage of his overall argument fails. Aquinas 
gives us no reason for believing that at least one necessary being 
must exist. 	 But, even if we allow him the first stage of the 
argument, there is no reason for allowing him the second. 	 The 
crucial proposition in this stage of the argument is proposition 
(5); that an infinite series of necessary beings, each having the 
cause of its necessity external to itself is impossible. The 
problem, however, is that Aquinas gives no new argument for the 
truth of this proposition. He feels that the argument offered in 
the first two ways against the possibility of infinite causal 
regression will suffice. "Just as we must Stop somewhere in a 
series of causes", he tells us, "so also in the series of things 
which must be and owe this to other things".' But, it might be 
replied, since the arguments of the first two ways were 
unsuccessful, so is the argument of the third. 
It would seem, then, that Aquinas fails to establish the 
existence of a necessary being which does not have the cause of its 
necessity external to itself. But, if he had succeeded, there 
would still be a question which he would need to answer. This 
question -concerns how we are to understand the notion of a 
1. Aquinas, _Bunzajhealgefrut, la,2,3. 
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necessary being which does not have the cause of its necessity 
external to itself. Either, it would seem, it must be the cause of 
its own necessity or there must be no cause of its necessity. Both 
of these answers, however, seem problematic. The problem with the 
first is that it is not clear how we are to give any meaning to the 
concept of a being which is the cause of its own necessity: The 
problem with the second is that firstly, we have no reason for 
accepting that only one such being exists and secondly, we have no 
reason for identifying such a being as supernatural, let alone as 
God. It seems equally feasible to think of the universe as 
necessary in this sense. Thus, the third of Aquinas' Five Ways 
fails in the same way that the first two did. 
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cc- In the preceding; chapters I argued that the Ontological and 
the Cosmological arguments for the existence of God were 
. inconclusive. This does not destroy natural theology, but it does 
cast doubt upon its ability to perform its traditional function in 
Christian apologetics./ What must now be considered is the question L 
of whether or not this entails the further conclusion that 
religious belief is irrational. 
On the face of it, the claim that religious belief is 
irrational in the absence of a . successful theistic proof is an 
entirely justified one. It is a common assumption amongst 
philosophers that the tailoring of belief to evidence is an 
essential feature of rationality. To be rational, on this view, is 
to proportion the degree of assent which one gives to a particular 
proposition to the amount of evidence confirming its truth. If we 
accept this assumption, we would also have to accept that it is 
irrational to hold any proposition with greater conviction than the 
evidence allows. Since the traditional arguments for the existence 
of God seem inconclusive, it seems to follow that positive 
acceptance of a theistic belief-system is irrational. 
This argument, or something very similar to it, is what Alvin 
Plantinga has refered to as the evidentialist objection to theistic 
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belief.' Religious belief is irrational, the evidentialist argues, 
since the available evidence does not confirm its truth. It is this 
objection to theistic belief which I now wish to consider. I will 
do this by asking, whether or not religious belief can be rational 
even if the believer is unable to produce evidence for his belief. 
In this chapter I will consider this question by examining the 
arguments of two contemporary philosophers, Norman Malcolm and 
Alvin Plantinga, who have defended religious belief against the 
evidentialist objection by answering it in the affirmative. 
Whilst there are significant differences between their respective 
positions, both point out that evidence must end somewhere and 
argue that belief in the existence of God belongs to that set of 
beliefs which does not require evidence. 
In a recent paper Norman Malcolm has defended religious belief 
against what he calls "the obsessive concern with proofs" exhibited 
by its philosophical critics.3 His basic contention is that 
1.Alvin Plantinga, "Rationality and Religious Belief", in 
Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, eds. Steven M. Cahn and • 
David Shatz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.258. 
2.See Norman Malcolm, "The Groundlessness of Belief", in Reason  
and Religion, ed. 	 Stuart C. Brown (Ithaca: 	 Cornell 
University Press, 1977); 	 and Plantinga, "Rationality and 
Religious Belief". 
3.Malcolm, "The Groundlessness of Belief", p. 154. 
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religious belief is groundless. By this he means not only that it 
is fruitless to seek grounds for religious belief, but also that it 
is a mistake to do so. Religious belief, he claims, is 
intellectually respectable even though the believer is unable to 
provide a rational justification of it, since the demand for 
justification is an inappropriate one. 
Malcolm begins his paper with some general remarks about the 
nature both of justification and belief. Taking his inspiration 
from Wittgenstein, he makes the observation that it is difficult to 
realize how much "mere acceptance, on the basis of no evidence, 
forms our lives". 1 The obvious example, he believes, is that of 
small children who must accept much of what they are told 
unreflectively before they can evenbegin to consider evidence or 
doubt the truth of what they are told. But Malcolm also claims 
that the lives of educated, sophisticated adults are formed by 
beliefs for which grounds are not sought; beliefs, furthermore, 
which lie at the very foundation of our conceptual scheme. The 
example which he cites is of the belief that familiar material 
objects do not cease to exist without some physical explanation. 
This principle, he tells us, "is an unreflective part of the 
framework within which physical investigations are made and 
physical explanations arrived at". 2 It is a principle, he holds, 
for which we would not seek grounds. It is what he calls' a 
framework principle, one .which defines the very boundaries of our 
1. Ibid., p.143. 
2. Ibid., p.145. 
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belief-system. Malcolm's position, however, is not Just that we do 
not seek grounds for our framework principles. He holds the much 
stronger position that it is a mistake to seek or to demand a 
justification of them. It is only within a belief-system, he 
argues, that we can ask questions, carry out investigations and 
make Judgments. It is only within a system, in other words, that 
Justification can occur. Since framework principles define the 
very boundaries of our belief-systems, it would be inappropriate to 
demand a Justification of them. 
Malcolm's claim is that each of us must live and think within 
a group of framework principles. 	 Each of us, therefore, must 
accept some set of beliefs which are groundless. 	 This is an 
inescapable feature of human existence. 	 But, he argues, the 
particular set of framework principles which we operate with is not 
one of our choice. It arises out of the community within which we 
live and is accepted by us without reflection. 
"We grow into a framework. We don't question it. 
We accept it trustingly. But this acceptance is not a 
consequence of reflection. We do not decide to accept 
framework propositions. We do not decide to live on 
earth, any more than we decide to learn our native 
tongue. We do cone to adhere to a framework 
proposition, in the sense that it forms the way we 
think. The framework propositions that we accept, grow 
into, are not idiosyncracies but common ways of 
speaking and thinking that are pressed on us by our 
human community. For our acceptance to have been 
withheld would have meant that we had not learned to 
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count, to measure, to use names, to play games, or even 
to talk."' 
Thus, it is appropriate to ask for the causes of our adherence 
to a particular set of framework principles, but it is not 
appropriate to ask for our grounds for holding them. Of course, 
there may be changes to our set of framework principles, but where 
such changes occur, Malcolm asserts, it will not be as a result of 
reflection upon evidence. It will be as a result of such factors 
as education, culture, family upbringing or even personal 
disasters. 
'Malcolm's main concern is to establish that the religious 
believer operates within a set of framework principles that are 
groundless and that he cannot be blamed for this, since everyone 
must do the same. The scientist, Malcolm asserts, is faced with a 
similar situation. 
"Religion is a form of life; 	 it is language 
embedded in action - what Wittgenstein calls a 
'language-game'. Science is another. Neither stands 
in need of justification, the one no more than the 
other. I2 
Malcolm makes quite a lot of this comparison between religion 
and science. This is highly understandable from his point of view. 
There is, after all, very little serious dispute about the 
intellectual respectability of science. Indeed, scientific inquiry 
is often presented as the very paradigm of rationality. If the 
1.Ibid., p. 147. 
2.Ibid., p. 156. 
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scientist must work within a set of framework principles which are 
groundless, one could hardly criticise the religious believer for 
doing the sane. 
The basic line of argument which Malcolm uses in defending his 
claim that religious belief is groundless, then, may be summarized 
as follows: Firstly, he argues that all belief-systems are based 
on framework principles which are groundless and, therefore, must 
ultimately be considered groundless themselves. Secondly, he argues 
. that, since religion is itself a belief-system it must also be 
considered groundless. Now, it seems to me that we can readily 
accept that religion is a system of belief fn some sense of the 
word. What must be considered, therefore, is the claim that all 
belief-systems are groundless. 
Malcolm, as we have seen, makes much of the parallel between 
science and religion. It may be useful, then, to consider what he 
has to say about science in order to come to grips with his more 
general claims about belief-systems. In his critique of Malcolm's 
paper, Colin Lyas has done precisely this.' Lyas argues, firstly, 
that Malcolm's favoured scientific framework principles are not 
obviously groundless and, secondly, that although some framework 
principles may be groundless and may well occur in religious 
contexts, this will not support the claim that religious belief as 
such is groundless. 
Lyas' argument rests upon a distinction between two very 
different types of framework principle. The first type he calls 
1. Colin Lyas, "The Groundlessness of Religious Belief", in 
Reason and Religion, ed. Brown, p.165. 
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"constitutive principles", the second "regulative principles". As 
examples of constitutive principles, Lyas cites principles such as, 
"It is wrong to ignore the result of a properly conducted 
experiment" and, "If there is a contradiction in a scientific 
theory it is worthless". These are principles, he argues, which 
are constitutive of scientific procedure (hence their name). To 
spell out these principles, he suggests, is to articulate what it 
means to engage in rational empirical enquiry and to question them 
is to question science itself. As examples of regulative 
principles, Lyas cites principles such as those which Malcolm used 
as examples of groundless beliefs in his paper. These are the 
principles that "things don't Just vanish" and that "nature is 
continuous". These principles differ from constitutive principles 
in that we can imagine changes in them without undermining science 
itself. To imagine changes in this type of principle, Lyas argues, 
"is not so much to change the meaning of the term 'science' as to 
produce a change in the scientific theories that occur within the 
framework of scientific inquiry". , The difference between 
constitutive principles and regulative principles, then, is that 
constitutive principles define the range of activities included in 
scientific investigation, whereas regulative principles are the 
basic presuppositions upon which scientific theories are built. 
Having drawn this distinction, Lyas goes on to argue that, 
whilst both may be deemed framework principles of science, it is 
not obviously the case that both are groundless. The constitutive 
principles, he suggests, may well be groundless, but the regulative 
1. Ibid., p. 168. 
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principles, those which Malcolm draws his examples from, do not 
seem to be. 
Lyas gives two reasons for holding that the constitutive 
principles are groundless. Firstly, the constitutive principles 
include the groundless laws of logic, such as the law of non-
contradiction. Abiding by these laws, he argues, is a condition of 
rational thought, and therefore it makes no sense to suppose that 
we might set them aside until they were proved rationally. 
Secondly, the constitutive principles define what "Justification" 
means and, therefore, it makes no sense to demand a Justification 
of them. 
"Suppose someone queried these methods and asked 
us to Justify them. We might ask him what 
'Justification' would mean here. If he replied, and it 
is difficult to see how he could avoid doing so, that 
he wishes to have them tested experimentally, wished 
them to be shown free of contradiction, and wished 
empirical evidence to be aduced in their support, then 
we would reply that in querying the methods of rational 
empirical enquiry (of which science is a formalized 
variety) it was these very test procedures he was 
questioning. ... . These constitutive principles are 
groundless in that our only reply when asked to Justify 
them is that without them Justification makes no sense. 
They are what 'Justification' means."1 
1. Ibid. 
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According to Lyas, then, constitutive principles are 
groundless and I think that we could well accept his position on 
this matter. But what about the regulative principles? These 
principles, Lyas argues, do not seem to be groundless. His main 
reason for adopting this view is "that there does seem to ... be 
such a thing as a fundamental change in theories of science.' 
These changes, Lyas argues, amount to a change in regulative 
principles. 
"Consider the problems which have led scientists 
to worry about such apparently fundamental beliefs as 
that the speed of light cannot be exceeded or that 
events cannot move backward in time or even that two 
events in different places can happen simultaneously. 
Consider, too, the problems which have led cosmologists 
to worry about the principle that something cannot just 
come into existence, a principle whose rejection might 
seem as much an affront to coon sense as would the 
rejection of Malcolm's principle that things can't just 
cease to exist. Yet if I understand the natter, some 
cosmologists do talk of the continuous creation of 
matter. In all these cases scientists come to question 
basic beliefs." 2 
Thus, it would seem that principles of the sort which Malcolm 
cites as examples of groundless belief can be and are questioned. 
Furthermore, Lyas argues, when they are questioned, this often 
1. Ibid., p. 169. 
2. Ibid. 
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leads to a change in them and this process does not occur 
groundlessly. By "using the constitutive procedures of rational 
empirical inquiry (science) scientists discover that a principle, 
hitherto unreflectively accepted, is less scientifically justified 
than another whose scientific credentials or grounds are less 
suspect".' It is by no means self-evident, then, as Malcolm seems 
to assume, that the regulative principles of scientific inquiry are 
beliefs for which no grounds can be sought or are sought. Indeed, 
this claim would appear incorrect. 
Now, what relevance has all this for Malcolm's claims about 
the groundlessness of religious belief? To begin with, Lyas has 
shown good reason for believing that not all scientific framework 
principles are groundless. If he is correct on this score, then 
Malcolm can no longer argue from the premise that all framework 
principles are groundless to the conclusion that religious 
framework beliefs are also groundless. Since it is not obvious 
that all framework beliefs are groundless, what is now required of 
Malcolm are specific arguments to support his claim that religious 
framework principles are. Failing this, we have no reason to 
accept his defense of religious belief against the evidentialist 
objection. Nor is it possible, as Lyas points out, for Malcolm to 
argue that religious framework beliefs are like the constitutive 
principles of science, principles which we have accepted as 
groundless. 
1. Ibid., p. 170. 
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"What I have allowed to be groundless in science 
is, so to speak, the rules of scientific proof. If the 
claim is that the groundless principles in religion are 
principles like these, then to concede this claim is to 
concede only that the rules of proof that are used in 
religious contexts are groundless. Now, whether or not 
the rules of proof that are used in religious context 
are like those that are used in scientific contexts, I 
cannot see that any religious apologist has anything to 
lose by conceeding that such rules of religious proof 
are groundless. For Just as a scientist might accept 
that his procedures of proof are groundless while yet 
maintaining that other important scientific beliefs, 
e.g., the belief in the continuity of nature, might be 
the subject of inquiry by these procedures, so the 
religious apologist night accept that his procedures of 
proof are groundless while yet maintaining that other 
central religious beliefs, e.g., belief in God, might 
be the subject of those procedures of proof."' 
This argument of Lyas' seems a plausible and a correct one. 
Malcolm, however, does not think so. In a reply to Lyas' paper he 
makes the following, somewhat ambiguous comment: 
"I won't attempt to follow Lyas' distinction 
between "constitutive" and "regulative" principles. A 
pie can be cut in many different shapes. In any case, 
I do not think the distinction applies to religious 
1. Ibid., p. 172. 
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belief, which is Lyas' main concern. Religious belief, 
as I understand it, is not composed of some set of 
framework principles. Belief in a God who creates, 
judges, and loves humanity is one form of religious 
belief. Belief in a mystical principle of causality 
according to which good produces good and evil produces 
evil, is another form of _religious belief. Those 
perspectives on reality are not hypotheses for or 
against which evidence can be marshalled."' 
Our initial problem with this reply of Malcolm's is one of 
interpretation. It is not entirely clear what position he wishes 
to adopt. There seem to be two alternatives. Firstly, he might be 
arguing that there is no set of beliefs con= to all religions 
which may be deemed the framework principles of religious belief as 
such, even though there are beliefs which may be identified as the 
framework principles of the particular religions or religious 
traditions. Secondly, he might be arguing that there is no set of 
beliefs at all which may be deemed the framework principles of 
religion, that the religious believer, no matter which particular 
religion he might adhere to, does not operate within a set of 
framework principles. Neither of these two alternatives, however, 
present a successful reply to Lyas' objection. 
The first alternative, it seems to me, just misses the point. 
Religious believers may or may not operate within a common set of 
1. Norman Malcolm, "Postscript", in season and Religion, ed. 
Brown p. 188. 
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framework principles, but the question of whether or not they do is 
irrelevant to Lyas' position. Malcolm's main argument in favour of 
his claim that religious belief is groundless, it will be 
remembered, consisted of two premises. The first premise was that 
all belief-systems are founded upon framework principles which are 
groundless and must therefore be considered groundless themselves. 
This premise, together with the claim that religion was itself a 
belief-system, was intended to generate the conclusion that 
religious belief is groundless. The main thrust of Lyas' objection 
was directed at the first premise. By showing that not all of what 
we might call the framework principles of science were obviously 
groundless he hoped to undermine Malcolm's claim that all framework 
principles are groundless and, in this way, to call into question 
Malcolm's conclusions about religious belief. The question of 
whether or not all religious believers adhere to the sane set of 
framework principles has little or no bearing on this natter. 
The sane cannot be said of the second alternative. If there 
is no set of beliefs which may be called the framework principles 
of religion, then Malcolm would be correct in his rejection of 
Lyas' criticism as irrelevant. The problem with this alternative, 
however, is that, prima facie, it would seem to be mistaken. The 
belief that God exists, for example, certainly appears to operate 
as a framework principle of the Christian religion. Moreover, it 
is difficult to see how we are to understand the claim that 
religious belief is groundless, if we accept that there is nothing 
which may be deemed a framework principle of religion. 
Nevertheless, Malcolm makes some interesting points with respect to 
these questions and it would be amiss not to consider them in 
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greater detail. 	 I will accept for the time being, then, 	the 
possibility that religious believers do not operate within a set of 
framework principles and explore further the claim that religious 
belief is groundless given this possibility. From my reading of 
his two papers it seems to me that what he might have in mind is 
something like the following: 
To begin with, Malcolm makes much of a distinction between the 
particular doctrines and creeds of a faith and what he calls the 
framework or attitude of religious belief. Furthermore, he claims 
that there may indeed be evidence for or against particular 
dotrines or creeds, but that this only occurs within this 
framework, which itself is groundless. 
"Many people who read about incidents in the life 
of Jesus, as recounted in the Gospels, or events in the 
lives of Hebrew prophets, as recounted in the Old 
Testament, do not believe that the incidents actually 
occurred. But it is also possible to believe that they 
occurred without regarding them as religiously 
significant. That a man should die and then come to 
life again is not necessarily of religious 
significance. 	 The miracles recounted in the 
Bible can be regarded as events of merely scientific 
interest. 	 They can be looked at from either a 
scientific or a religious Weltanschauung. 	 It is only 
from, or within, the framework of religious belief that 
they have religious import."' 
1. Ibid., p. 186. 
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What Malcolm appears to be saying is that the fundamental 
difference between the believer and the sceptic resides in the fact 
that the believer adopts a particular way of looking at and 
interpreting the world, a particular Weltanschauung, which the 
sceptic does not. A sceptic, Malcolm tells us, may accept that all 
of the incidents which are described in both the Gospels and the 
Old Testament actually occurred without regarding them as 
religiously significant. He is looking at and interpreting them 
from a different, non-religious, perspective. What distinguishes 
the believer and the sceptic, then, on this interpretation of 
Malcolm, is not the fact that the believer accepts a set of 
framework principles which the sceptic does not, but the fact that 
the believer adopts a particular way of looking at the world which 
is significantly different from the sceptic's and which, like that 
of the sceptic, is ultimately groundless. 
There is much of value in what Malcolm has to say. To begin 
with, we can, with some qualification, accept his assertion that 
the believer and the sceptic can be thought to reach agreement 
about the occurrence of the events described in the Scriptures. 
The qualification is that the Scriptures are not interpreted 
literally. It is inconceivable, for example, that the sceptic 
accept the creation story as it is presented in Genesis. 
Nevertheless, many believers do not accept a literal interpretation 
of this story either and it is here, perhaps, that he has a 
point. He is not arguing, after all, that all religious believers 
and sceptics will agree about the actual occurrence of all the 
events described in the Scriptures, merely that they could and 
perhaps he is not too far from the truth on this natter. Modern 
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biblical criticism has, after all lead to a complete reassessment 
of how the Scriptures are to be understood, for many believers. 
But, and this is important, if believers and sceptics should ever 
reach agreement about what actually did and what did not occur of 
the events described in the Scriptures, it seems to me that this 
will cone about as a result of believers coming to reject the 
miraculous rather than the sceptic coning to accept it asMalcolm 
seems to think. This is a process which is already occurring in 
some quarters. 
Whatever the correctness of Malcolm's views on this matter, 
however, it seems indisputable that believer and sceptic may agree 
about the actual occurrence of many of the events described in the 
Scriptures. Many sceptics, for example, would certainly accept 
I 	 - that a person calledLJesus bar Joseph actually lived approximately 
2,000 years ago, and he spent the last years of his life preaching, 
that he was crucified by the Romans and that there were reports of 
his subsequent ressurection. 	 It is 
significant difference between the 
concerning these events is that the 
having religious significance whereas 
also indisputable that a 
believer and the sceptic 
believer interprets them as 
the sceptic does not. But 
what is involved in attributing religious significance to some 
event? This is the question which must now be asked. 
If I am interpreting Malcolm correctly, his answer to this 
question is that the believer looks at the world from a certain 
perspective, a perspective which may be termed religious, but which 
Is not to be defined in terms of any set of framework principles. 
But, if it is not to be defined in terns of any set of framework 
principles, how is it to be defined? Perhaps in terms of certain 
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attitudes, such as those of reverence and awe, or certain actions, 
such as those of worship and prayer, which the believer 
characteristically exhibits. Malcolm is far from explicit onthis 
point, but it appears that this is what he has in mind. This, 
however, cannot be the complete story. If the Christian sees the 
events described in the Scriptures as worthy of awe and reverence, 
or responds to them in worship and prayer, it is because he sees 
them as being manifestations of God's presence, an intervention by 
Him in the affairs of the World. But this, of course, presupposes 
a belief in the existence of God. It is this belief which, for the 
believer, makes his response an appropriate one. 
The belief that God exists, then, certainly appears to be a 
framework principle of Christianity. Without it one could hardly 
consider oneself a Christian. But, if it is a framework principle, 
must we accept that it is a groundless framework principle? Only 
if we agree that all framework principles are groundless, or are 
presented with independent reasons for believing that religious 
framework principles are. As Lyas has shown, Malcolm does not 
provide us with either. 
II 
The second defense of religious belief against the 
evidentialist objection that I wish to consider is that of Alvin 
Plantinga in his paper, "Rationality and Religious Belief". 
Plantinga's basic contention is that religious belief is properly 
basic; that, under certain circumstances, it is perfectly rational 
for the theist to hold that God exists even though he may not be 
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able to appeal to any evidence in support of his belief. To this 
extent, then, he agrees with Malcolm. Where he disagrees is on the 
question of whether or not religious belief is groundless. He 
holds, as we shall see, that a belief which is properly basic is 
not necessarily one which is groundless. 
Plantinga's paper is comprised of two distinct sections. The 
first is an extensive critique of the evidentialist's position, the 
second, a defense of his own claims about religious belief against 
possible objections. Since I consider that which Plantinga has to 
say in the first part of his paper to be substantially correct, I 
will concentrate my attention mainly upon the second part. 
Nevertheless, a summary of his critique of the evidentialist's 
position is essential to a full understanding of his own claims 
about religious belief and I will begin with this. 
Plantinga begins his critique of the evidentialist's position 
with an observation that it rests upon a general philosophical 
position which he calls "classicial foundationalise. 
"The evidentialist objection is nearly always 
rooted in classical foundationalism, an enormously 
popular picture or total way of looking at faith, 
knowledge, justified belief, rationality and allied 
topics. We may think of the classical 
foundationalist as beginning with the observation that 
so ne of one's beliefs may be based upon others; it may 
be that there are a pair of propositions A and B such 
that I believe A on the basis of B. Although this 
relation isn't easy to characterize in a revealing and 
non-trivial fashion, it is nonetheless familiar. I 
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believe that the ward "umbrageous" is spelled u-mrb-r-
ageou s: this belief is based on another belief of 
mine; the belief that that's how the dictionary says 
it's spelled. 4 6 4  Some of my beliefs, however, I 
accept but don't accept on the basis of any other 
beliefs. Call these beliefs basic. I believe that 2 + 
1 = 3, for example, and don't believe it on the basis 
of other propositions. I also believe that I am seated 
at my desk, and that there is a mild pain in my right 
knee. These too are basic for me; I don't believe 
them on the basis of any other propositions. According 
to the classicial foundationalist, some propositions 
are properly or rightly basic for a person and some are 
not. Those that are not, are rationally accepted only 
on the basis of evidence, where the evidence must trace 
back, ultimately, to what is properly basic."' 
This position is familiar enough. 	 Included amongst its 
adherents, as Plantinga points out, are such great philosophers as 
Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke and, more 
recently, Roderick Chisholm.2 Not all of these philosophers, of 
course, were critical of theistic belief. But there has been a 
common assumption amongst both sceptics and believers that belief 
in God is rational only if it is accepted on the basis of 
propositions which are properly basic; that it is not properly 
1.Plantinga, "Rationality and Religious Belief", p. 259. 
2.Ibid. 
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basic itself. 	 This is the assumption underlying Aquinas' five 
ways, for example. But why must we accept this assumption? Why 
are we prohibited from holding that belief in God is properly 
basic? There is no reason at all, Plantinga suggests, unless we 
accept the classical foundationalist's criteria for proper 
basicality. Accordingly, his critique of classical foundationalism 
and, hence, of the evidentialist objection, focuses upon these 
criteria for proper basicality, as embodied in the following 
proposition: 
"a proposition p is properly basic for a person S 
if and only if p is either self-evident to S or 
incorrigible for S•"' 
Plantinga has two objections concerning the acceptability of 
this criterion of proper basicality.2 Firstly, he argues that it 
is self-referentially incoherent. The foundationalist wishes to 
argue that self-evident and incorrigible propositions are properly 
basic and that only propositions of this sort are properly basic. 
But, Plantinga asks, why should we accept this criterion? It does 
not appear to be self-evident and it is certainly not incorrigible. 
Furthermore, he argues, it is very difficult to see that it either 
follows from or is evident with respect to propositions that are 
either self-evident or incorrigible. Hence, Plantinga argues, the 
1.Ibid., p. 265. 
2.Richard Grigg, "Theism and Proper Basicality: a Response to 
Plantinga", International Journal for Philosophy of Religion  
14 (1983), p. 123. 
- 131 - 
foundationalist is "hoist on his own petard".' 
Plantinga's second objection to the foundationalist's 
criterion of proper basicality is that there are numerous beliefs 
which we would normally accept as properly basic that do not 
satisfy it. Particular perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs and 
beliefs which ascribe mental states to other persons are the 
examples which he cites. 2 Consider the following statements of 
belief: 
(1) I see a tree 
(2) I had breakfast this morning 
(3) That person is angry 
Such beliefs are basic, they do not arise out of other beliefs 
that we hold, but they are neither self-evident nor incorrigible. 
They do not, therefore, satisfy the foundationalist's criterion of 
proper basicality, but it seems ridiculous to suggest that we are 
not rationally entitled to hold them until we can provide 
evidential support for them. 
As I have already indicated, these objections of Plantinga's 
appear to me to be substantially correct. Before going on to 
consider the second part of his paper, his defense of the claim 
that belief in God may be taken as properly basic, however, there 
are two points which must be made. Firstly, Plantinga does not 
consider himself to be making an entirely original contribution to 
the philosophy of religion when he asserts that religious belief 
may be taken as properly basic. He sees himself as merely 
1. Plantinga, "Rationality and Religious Belief", p. 269. 
2. Ibid., p. 270. 
- 132 - 
articulating a position which he feels is implicit within the 
tradition of Reformed theology.' He believes that Reformed 
theologians, in their outright rejection of natural theology, 
should be interpreted as rejecting classical foundationalism. 
Accordingly, he draws heavily upon the Reformed tradition of 
theology and, in particular, upon its founder Calvin. 
The second point that I wish to make is that Plantinga's 
rejection of classical foundationalism does not entail a rejection 
of foundationalism as such. In an earlier paper, he distinguished 
between classical and weak foundationalism. 2 Adherents to both of 
these positions, he argues, accept that a rational noetic structure 
is one which has a foundation; that is, one which is based upon a 
set of beliefs which are properly basic. Both also accept that a 
rational noetic structure is one in which non-basic belief will be 
proportional in strength to support from the foundations. The weak 
foundationalist, however, will accept amongst the foundations of a 
rational noetic structure beliefs which are neither self-evident 
nor incorrigible. Plantinga, as I understand his position, is 
rejecting classical foundationalism in favour of some form of weak 
foundational ism. 
Having made these points, we may now turn to the second part 
of Plantinga's paper; his defense of the assertion that belief in 
God may be taken as properly basic. In particular, he wishes to 
1. Ibid. 
2. Alvin Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology", 
American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings, 1980, 
p. 56. 
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make two points. Firstly, he argues that even though the believer 
may have no evidence for his belief that God exists and even though 
this belief may be neither self-evident nor incorrigible to him, 
this does not mean that it is gratuitous or arbitrary. Secondly, 
he argues that, even though he is unable to replace the classical 
foundationalist's criterion of proper basicality with one of his 
own, this does not mean that he cannot include belief in God 
amongst the set of beliefs which he accepts as properly basic, or 
that, if he does, he is committed to accepting just any belief. 
Let us take each of these points in turn. To begin with, he 
claims that a belief which is basic, but which is neither self-
evident nor incorrigible, is not necessarily a groundless one. 
Consider the following case: 
"Upon having an experience of a certain sort, I 
believe that I am perceiving a tree. In the typical 
case, I do not hold this belief on the basis of other 
beliefs; it is nonetheless not groundless. My having 
that characteristic sort of experience - to use 
Prof essoi Ch i sho I m ' s language, my being appeared treely 
to - plays a crucial role in the formation and 
justification of that belief. We might say this 
experience, together, perhaps, with other 
circumstances, is what justifies me in holding it; 
this is the ground of my justification, and, by 
extension, the ground of the belief itself."' 
1. Plantinga, "Rationality and Religious Belief", p.271. 
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Thus, in the case of perceptual beliefs such as the belief 
that I see a tree, there is a condition that confers Justification 
upon my belief; there is a circumstance which stands as the ground 
of Justification. In this case, the condition in question is that 
I am appeared to in the appropriate manner. This, of course, is 
not the only condition. There are other conditions; for example, 
that I have not taken any\hal lucinogenic drugs. Nevertheless, the 
important point which Plantinga wishes to make is that a belief is 
properly basic only under certain conditions which may be taken as 
the ground of its Justification. The same, he claims, may be said 
of belief in God. 
"When the reformers claim that this is properly 
basic, they do not mean to say, of course, that there 
are no Justifying circumstances for it, or that it is 
in that sense groundless or gratuitous. 	 Quite the 
contrary. 	 Calvin holds that God "reveals and daily 
discloses himself in the whole workmanship of the 
universe",and the divine art "reveals itself in the 
innumerable and yet distinct and well ordered variety 
of the heavenly host". God has so created us that we 
have a tendency or disposition to see his hand in the 
world about us. More precisely, there is in us a 
disposition to believe propositions of the sort 'this 
flower was created by God' or 'this vast and intricate 
universe was created by God' when we contemplate the 
flower or behold the starry heavens or think about the 
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vast reaches of the universe."' 
These are not the only circumstances which Plantinga believes 
will call forth belief in God. 2 When reading the Bible, he argues, 
one may be impressed with a deep sense of God's presence. Doing 
what I know to be wrong may lead to feelings of guilt in the eyes 
of God, repentance may lead to feeling forgiven by Him. A person 
in danger may turn to God, asking for his assistance and 
protection. A person at peace with himself may feel a sense of 
gratitude to God and may praise Him for his goodness. There are 
many other conditions, Plantinga suggests, which call forth belief 
in God, but this, he feels, is enough to convey the sort of thing 
he is talking about. 
Strictly speaking, then, it is not the belief that God exists 
that is basic, but beliefs such as those expressed in the 
following statements: 
(4) God is speaking to me 
(5) God has created all this 
(6) God disapproves of what I have done 
(7) God forgives me 
(8) God is to be thanked and praised. 
These propositions, Plantings argues, are properly basic in 
the right circumstances, but we are still Justified in speaking of 
the belief that there is such a person as God as properly basic 
even though to do so would be to speak somewhat loosely. 
1. Ibid., p. 272. 
2. Ibid. 
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Plantinga's argument, then, consists of an analogy between 
belief in God and those beliefs which few would dispute the proper 
basicality of such asberceptual beliefs, memory beliefs and beliefs 
ascribing mental states to other persons. These beliefs, he 
argues, are not arbitrary or gratuitous because there are certain 
circumstances or conditions which serve as the ground of their 
justification. The sane is true, he argues, of belief in God. 
There are certain circumstances or conditions out of which theistic 
belief arises and which serve as the ground of its justification. 
For this reason, he holds, it may be described as properly basic. 
Now, I think that we can readily accept what Plantinga says about 
perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs and beliefs ascribing mental 
states to other persons but there are important questions which 
need to be raised about theistic belief. These questions, I 
believe, concern the conditions or circumstances which serve as the 
grounds for belief in God. Let us begin, then, by examining thema 
little more closely. 
The first point I wish to make is this: When Plantinga talks 
about the conditions or circumstances which give rise to theistic 
belief, he is referring to experiences which are had not only by 
theists, but also by sceptics. Consider some of the examples 1. 
he cites! 	 * 	 the experiences of contemplating the beauty 
of a flower, beholding the vastness and complexity of the universe, 
or reading the Bible These are experiences which are had both by 
sceptics and believers. But, if this is the case, then there is an 
important difference between them and the experiences which give 
rise, say, to perceptual beliefs. 
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"...while nearly everyone who has experience x is 
led to the belief that he or she is seeing a tree, 
experience y leads some to a particular belief about 
God but leads many others in different directions. . 
For example, many persons have had the experience of 
being awed by the beauty of the universe without being 
led to believe in a wise creator. 	 The theist might 
argue that his own response is the natural one, that, 
after all, it has been a nearly universal response 
through the bulk of Western history and that the modern 
unbeliever is an\aberration,and must self-conciously 
oppose this very natural belief. 	 But this argument 
does not take account of traditionally nontheistic 
religions such as \Taoism,, Confucianism, or Theravada 
Buddhism."' 
/ .Plantinga argues).hat there is a natural tendency or disposition 
within us to believe propositions such as "this flower was created 
by God" or "this vast and intricate universe was created by God" 
when we contemplate a flower or think about the vastness and 
complexity of the universe. But, if there is this natural 
disposition within us, we would expect theistic belief to be an 
almost universal phenomenon. The fact that it is not, surely, 
undermines Plantinga's claim. 
Reformed theologians, of course, have been fully aware of the 
fact that many people do not believe in God and that many 
1. Grigg, "Theism and Proper Basicality: 	 a Response to 
Plantinga", p. 126. 
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believers, at times, find it difficult to maintain their belief. 
Their response has been to assert that the minds of those who find 
it difficult to believe in God, or who reject theistic belief 
outright, are clouded by sin. "Were it not for the existence of 
sin in the world," Plantinga clains, "hunnan beings would believe 
in God to the sane degree and with the sane natural spontaneity 
that we believe in the existence of other persons, an external 
world, or the past".' The problem with this response, however, is 
that it simply begs the question. 2 It presupposes theism and, 
hence, will only appeal to someone who already believes in God. It 
will cover no ground in convincing the sceptic that what Plantinga 
calls a natural tendency or disposition towards theistic belief is 
not merely an unconscious bias towards a belief-system which has 
tremendous psychological appeal. 
Plantinga, however, is not overly concerned by the fact that 
many people will not accept that belief in God is properly basic, 
as is evident when we consider the second point which he makes in 
defense of his position. Here he argues that the theist is not 
committed to accepting that any and every belief is properly basic 
if we reject the classical foundationalist's criterion of proper 
basicality but are unable to replace it with one of our own. A 
person who rejects the logical positivist's criterion of meaning 
and is unable to - replace it with some new criterion of his own is 
1. Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology", p. 
51. 
2. Gary Gutting, Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism (Notre 
Dane: University of Notre Dane Press, 1982), P.  84. 
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not thereby committed to accepting that /the proposition "Teas brillig; 
and the slithy toves did gyre and ,gimble ' in the wabe" is 
meaningful, 'Plantinga argues. 	 Why, then, should the Reformed 
epistemologist beembarrassed by/his own inability to replace the _ 	 -- 
classicial foundationalist's criterion of proper basicality with 
one of his own? He is not, Plantinga argues, committed to holding 
that just any belief, belief in the Great Pumpkin or in Voodoo, for 
example, is properly basic as a result of this. The important 
question, he feels, concerns the way in which we are to develop 
criteria for proper basicality and the correct way of doing this, 
he argues, is inductive. 
"We must assemble examples of . beliefs and 
conditions such that the former are obviously properly 
basic In the latter, and examples of beliefs and 
conditions such that the former are obviously not 
properly basic in the latter. We must then frame 
hypotheses as to the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of proper basicality and test these 
hypotheses by reference to those examples."' 
The theist, then, is not committed to accepting that just any 
belief is properly basic. The fact that he accepts as one of his 
examples of properly basic belief, the 'belief that God exists, 
Plantinga argues, does not commit him to accepting that belief in 
the Great Pumpkin is also properly basic. The theist is quite free 
to propose belief in God as one of his examples of rational basic 
belief and belief in the Great Pumpkin as one of his examples of 
1. Plantinga, "Rationality and Religious Belief", p. 276. 
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irrational basic belief. 	 Furthermore, Plantinga suggests, we 
should not expect that everyone will agree with the theist in this 
and, more importantly with respect to our argument, we should not 
be toavconcerned by this fact. _ 
"...there is no reason to assume, in advance, that 
everyone will agree on the examples. The Christian or 
Jew will of course suppose that belief in God is 
entirely proper and rational; if he doesn't accept 
this belief on the basis of other propositions, he will 
conclude that it is basic for him and quite properly 
so. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn Murray 
O'Hare may disagree, but how is that relevant? Must my 
criteria, or those of the believing community, conform 
to their examples? Surely not. The theistic community 
is responsible to its set of examples, not to theirs."' 
Plantinga's method of dealing with the fact that not everyone 
will accept belief in God amongst their examples of properly basic 
belief, then, is to assert that an epistemalogist's stock of 
examples will be community relative.2 	 He would appear to be 
claiming, in this passage, that what may or may not be accepted as 
properly basic is a function of the community to which one belongs. 
1.Ibid. 
2.J. Wesley Robbins, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?", 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1983), p. 
246. 
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The fact that not everyone will agree with the Christian or the Jew 
when they claim that belief in God is properly basic is not a 
consideration that they need to take account of, he is arguing, 
since the theistic community must conform to its set of examples 
not to the set of examples of people outside this community. 
The problem with this response, however, is that it would 
appear to be in direct conflict with his claim that belief in God 
is properly basic only in virtue of the fact that we have a natural 
disposition to believe certain propositions about God under certain 
circumstances or conditions.' This would appear to be a statement 
to the effect that proper basicality is a function of and grounded 
in objective facts. Plantinga must decide which of these two 
conflicting positions he wishes to adopt. 
This problem is a very real one for Plantinga and there are 
difficulties whichever position he adopts. If he adopts the 
position that proper basicality is a function of the community to 
which one belongs, then all that he is saying when he asserts that 
belief in God is properly basic is that the theistic community 
accepts it without question. 2 If, on the other hand, he wishes to 
assert that proper basicality is a function of objective facts, 
then he cannot ignore the fact that many people do not cone to 
believe propositions about God under the circumstances which he 
cites. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 247. 
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CO NC I- LT SION- 
Having reached the end of this dissertation, it is important 
to decide what exactly it is that we are entitled to 
conclude. 
At the very least, we can say that each of the positions 
considered here is problematic, that none of the thinkers examined 
have succeeded in providing a satisfactory defense of the 
rationality of religious belief. However, I think that we can go 
further than this. In so far as each philosopher considered has 
been historically influential and representative of a broader 
philosophical position, it is my opinion that we are entitled to 
draw the further conclusion that our findings cause some doubt 
about the possibility of ever finding a successful defense of the 
rationality of Christianity. 
Does this mean that religious belief can be dismissed as 
irrational? I think not. There are two important areas, or types 
of argument if you like, that we have not considered. The first of 
these is the cumulative case argument. Basil Mitchell, for 
example, has argued that: 
"What has been taken as a series of failures when 
treated as attempts at purely deductive or inductive 
arguments could better be understood as contributions 
to a cumulative case. On this view the theist is urging 
that traditional Christian theism makes better sense of 
all the evidence available than does any alternative on 
offer, and the atheist is contesting the claim. The 
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dispute concerns what Gilbert Ryle calls 'the 
plausibility of theories' rather than proof or 
probability in any strict sense."' 
Mitchell holds, then that a successful Christian apologetic 
might be possible if we look at the over-all picture and treat each 
individual argument as part of a cumulative case. 
Another important area that we have not looked at is that of 
the rational appraisal of religious experience. As Yandell points 
out, appeals to incorrigible religious experiences as guarantees of 
truth are as old as religion itself.2 They require due attention 
and consideration before we can dismiss Christian Apologetics 
altogether. 
Our general conclusion, then, is gloomy for the believer 
without being damning. It suggests dead ends that can be avoided 
but cannot rule out the posibility of a rational defense of 
Christianity altogether. 
1.Basil Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief  
(London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 39. 
2.Keith E. 	 Yandell, 	 "Religious Experience and Rational 
Appraisal," Religious Studies 10, p. 173. 
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